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Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting,
and the Paradox of Compliance
William S. Laufer 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1343 (1999)
The evolution of corporate criminal law is explained by the
shifting risks of liability and loss between corporations and their
agents in accommodating the illogic of vicarious liability. A vivid
example of the effects of this risk shifting is seen with the recent emer-
gence of the good citizen corporation movement. This movement en-
courages prosecutors with vast discretion to leverage indictments and
convictions of subordinate agents, resort to civil and administrative
actions against large and medium-sized corporations in place of crimi-
nal indictments, compromise agent indemnification, and enforce corpo-
rate self-regulation through elaborate plea agreements. Not surpris-
ingly, organizations tend to conceive of corporate compliance, no less
corporate ethics, as matters of risk management that serve an impor-
tant insurance function.
Corporations that purchase only the amount of compliance nec-
essary to effectively shift liability away from the firm encourage moral
hazards. After risks are transferred, the firm's incentive to maintain
high levels of care decreases. Crimes once imputed to the firm remain
with "wayward" agents. Given equivocal evidence of compliance effec-
tiveness, the rise of the good corporate citizenship movement risks
undermining the objectives and spirit of the corporate criminal law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With recent criminal cases brought against some of the most
respected corporations in the Fortune 500, it seems reasonable to
conclude that large, publicly traded companies have become favored
targets of a new breed of aggressive prosecutors.' Add to this the oft-
repeated observation that corporations are more vulnerable than ever
before to an expanded scope of criminal liability and draconian fines
meted out by judges bound by restrictive federal guidelines.2 These
1. Commentators often refer to the costly resolution of civil and criminal charges against
large corporations as evidence of the emergence of a draconian corporate criminal law. Large,
publicly traded corporations, however, are most often spared conviction and typically are routed
through civil and administrative proceedings. See infra notes 178-94 and accompanying text.
On average, small privately held businesses account for more than 95% of all corporate
convictions each year. See William S. Laufer, A Study of Small Business Compliance Practices,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND SYMPOSIUM ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES,
CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA: STRENGTHENING THE "GOOD CITIZEN" CORPORATION 135 (Sept. 7-
8, 1995) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]; William S. Laufer & Donald L. Darnell, Corporate
Compliance and the Small Firm, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP., Oct. 1995, at 1, 2 (discussing the
results of a U.S. Sentencing Commission-sponsored study of compliance practices of small
firms).
2. Data from the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission') are inadequate
to support the conclusion that prosecutions following the passage of the Sentencing Guidelines
for Organizations ("Guidelines") have resulted in an increased number of convictions with
significantly higher fines. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS (1997). So, too, are studies that consider only a small subset of cases,
such as sentences given to publicly held firms, e.g., Cindy R. Alexander et al., Regulating
Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms, J.L. &
1344
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observations and the conventional wisdom that attends them are
touted along with a new corporate law gospel in practitioner
conferences on the "good citizen" corporation.3
The spirit of this gospel is summed up in such catch phrases as
"organizational due diligence," ".corporate compliance," and "proactive"
or "reactive" ethics initiatives.4  An elaborate cottage industry of
ethics compliance and preventive law experts lay claim to
dramatically reducing the likelihood of criminal liability by
maintaining an organizational commitment to ethical standards.5
Corporations need only commit the necessary capital and human
resources to insure against the devastation of a criminal
investigation, indictment, and conviction. 6 Unfortunately, the reality
of corporate compliance and criminal liability is far more complex
than most of these experts suggest.7
ECON. (forthcoming). Commentators, though, appear convinced of a dramatic rise in liability
despite a lack of supporting evidence. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 833 (1994) ("Both the maximum
allowable criminal fines for corporate crime and the fines actually imposed on corporations have
increased dramatically in the last ten years.'); Kevin B. Huff, The Role of Corporate Compliance
Programs in Determining Corporate Criminal Liability: A Suggested Approach, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 1252, 1252 (1996) ("Corporations increasingly face the daunting spectre of being held
criminally liable for the illegal acts of their employees."); Philip A. Lacovara & David P. Nicoli,
Vicarious Criminal Liability of Organizations: RICO As An Example of a Flawed Principle in
Practice, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 725, 732 (1990) ("[Piarticularly in the last several decades,
society has witnessed a 'sweeping expansion' of organizational criminal liability.'); Dan K. Webb
et al., Understanding and Avoiding Corporate and Executive Criminal Liability, 49 BUS. LAW.
617, 617-18 (1994) ("In the last two decades, the increase in criminal and regulatory
investigations and prosecutions of corporations has been staggering.").
3. See generally CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AFTER CAREMARK (Carole L. Basri et al. eds.,
1997); CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: CAREMARK AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF GOOD CORPORATE
CONDUCT (Carole L. Basri et al. eds., 1998); CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: How TO BE A GOOD
CITIZEN CORPORATION THROUGH SELF-POLICING (Joseph E. Murphy & Gregory J. Wallance eds.,
1996); JEFFREY M. KAPLAN ET AL., COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THE CORPORATE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: PREVENTING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY (1998).
4. For articles using these phrases, see, e.g., Huff, supra note 2; William S. Laufer,
Corporate Culpability and the Limits of Law, 6 BUS. ETHICS Q. 311 (1996); Note, Growing the
Carrot: Encouraging Effective Corporate Compliance, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1783 (1996).
5. See generally ALI-ABA, ORGANIZING FOR CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AVOID CORPORATE
LAWBREAKING THROUGH PREVENTIVE LAWYERING (1992); William S. Laufer & Diana C.
Robertson, Corporate Ethics Initiatives as Social Control, 16 J. Bus. ETHICS 1029 (1997). For a
wonderful discussion of the discovery of compliance as a growth industry, see Stuart Auerbach,
Company Lawyers in Shadows at Seminar on Crime, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1977, at A4.
6. See George P. Stamas & Joanne F. Catanese, Compliance Programs Create a Shield
from Corporate Wrongs, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 24, 1997, at S37. See generally PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 1.
7. See generally Steven Walt & William S. Laufer, Corporate Criminal Liability and the
Comparative Mix of Sanctions, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 309 (Kip Schlegel &
David Weisburd eds., 1992) (discussing the relation between liability rules and corporate
sanctions); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996);
William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647 (1994) (suggesting
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The first part of this Article argues that the evolution of
corporate criminal law in the United States, as well as the dramatic
rise of the compliance industry, is understood best by examining the
shifting risks of liability and loss between corporations and their
agents in accommodating the illogic of vicarious liability.3 Over the
last century, courts have imposed joint and several liability on firms
and their agents in a series of distinctly different phases.9 These
phases range from the ideal of a shared liability risk between the firm
and its agents at the turn of the twentieth century to a risk of liability
and loss that has been pushed down the corporate hierarchy from
senior managers to subordinate "wayward" employees. 10 Throughout
how corporate culpability and liability may be reconceptualized as constructive fault); William
S. Laufer, Integrity, Diligence, and the Limits of Good Corporate Citizenship, 34 AM. BUS. L.J.
157 (1996) [hereinafter Laufer, Integrity] (arguing that the Sentencing Guidelines have shifted
discretion from the judiciary to prosecutors and regulators).
8. Notably, the hypotheses that guide this Article are specific to the risks and costs of
corporate criminal liability. Much of the literature on commercial risks, and risks of the
economic system generally, extend well beyond its scope. See, e.g., VIRGINIA HAUFLER,
DANGEROUS COMMERCE: INSURANCE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RISK (1997). The
notion of principal-agent risk shifting and sharing has been discussed at length in tort law. See
generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499 (1961); William 0. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk 1, 38 YALE
L.J. 584 (1929); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise
and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345 (1982); Reinier H. Kraakman,
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984)
Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90
YALE L.J. 1 (1980). For a consideration of risk in relation to various regimes of corporate
criminal liability, see Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691; Jennifer Arlen & Reinier
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997). Analogous issues at different levels of analysis are considered in
economics. See generally FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND RISK
SHARING (1994); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987); Yakov Amihud
& Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J.
ECON. 605 (1981) (discussing the hypothesis that managers engage in conglomerate mergers to
decrease their employment risk); Alan J. Marcus, Risk Sharing and the Theory of the Firm, 13
BELL J. ECON. 369 (1982) (discussing the effects of deviating from perfect risk sharing where
managers make decisions for owners); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the
Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979) (discussing Pareto optimal fee
schedules in relation to the risk assumed by agents and principals). For a general discussion of
the reciprocity of risks, see JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 252-69 (1992).
9. The standard of vicarious liability poses unique challenges to the adxihinistration of the
criminal law. See FREDA ADLER ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE 38-39 (1994); Laufer, supra note 4.
Its place in tort law, though, is rarely challenged. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 14 (1991) ('Imposing exemplary damages on the corporation when its agent commits
intentional fraud creates a strong incentive for vigilance by those in a position 'to guard
substantially against the evil to be prevented."') (quoting Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell,
274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927)); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998). For an excellent discussion of the etiology of
vicarious liability, see G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 50-
55 (1980).
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each period, liability risks reflect the divergent interests and risk
concerns of principals and agents."
Part II concludes with a discussion of the evolution away from
entity liability in the latter part of this century, an evolution
underwritten through concessions offered by state and federal courts,
to the strictures of vicarious liability.12 Most of these concessions
were prompted by initiatives inside the firm, such as legal strategies
that shift risk of liability and loss.'3 Organizations also have engaged
in a number of initiatives outside the firm to shift corporate liability
through the active lobbying of legislative bodies and law
commissions. 14
10. The distinction between risk shifting and sharing was described by one court as
follows: "Risk shifting involves one party's shifting its risk of loss to another, whereas risk
sharing involves the party onto whom risk is shifted distributing a portion of that risk among
others." Black Hills Corp. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 173, 182 (1993); see also Alan 0. Sykes,
The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule
and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1988).
11. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. The discussion of agency issues in
relation to criminal liability assumes that both principal and agent are utility maximizers. The
usual litany of contract assumptions apply as well, such as to the importance of the equity
contract, limited liability, and diversified investment portfolios as risk bearing devices for
shareholders. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)
(discussing the importance of market and contract controls that, at least in theory, are designed
to align the divergent interests of owners and managers).
12. Other sociopolitical forces have influenced corporate criminal law enforcement during
this century. Edwin Sutherland, whose exposition in 1949 on "White-Collar Crime" gave the
term its current meaning, wrote extensively about the shift in liability away from businesses
caused by forces external to the firm. See EDWIN SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949).
For a fascinating analysis of the role of politics in shaping the substantive criminal law, see
generally John P. Heinz et al., Legislative Politics and the Criminal Law, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 277
(1969).
13. Organizations, for example, shift risks of liability entirely to agents by asking courts to
reconsider the reasoning of imputing liability to an entity that has engaged in a good faith effort
of organizational due diligence. Corporations have defeated the strict attribution of criminal
liability by actively avoiding or eliminating risks through diligent business practices. Firms
regularly provide director and officer insurance for a vast array of losses. This is not to say, of
course, that courts have not contributed to evisceration of vicarious liability. Rather, the point
is that firms have taken a definitive and strategic role in countering the risk of liability. For a
discussion of such practices in the context of risk shifting and risk management, see generally
Whitney Adams, New Rules on Corporate Sentencing, RISK MGMT., May 1992, at 52 (discussing
the effects of the Guidelines on internal controls and risk management); George S. Oldfield &
Anthony M. Santomero, Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 39 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 33
(1997). Risk shifting is also discussed in a host of analogous contexts. See, e.g., Benjamin C.
Esty, A Case Study of Organizational Form and Risk Shifting in the Savings and Loan Industry,
44 J. FIN. ECON. 57 (1997); T. Harikumar, Leverage, Risk-Shifting Incentive, and Stock-Based
Compensation, 19 J. FIN. RES. 417 (1996); Robert M. Wiseman & Anthony H. Catanach, Jr., A
Longitudinal Disaggregation of Operational Risk Under Changing Regulations: Evidence from
the Savings and Loan Industry, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 799 (1997).
14. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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In Part III, the emergence of the "good citizen" corporation
movement over the past decade is discussed as the culmination of
intracorporate risk shifting away from the entity and toward
subordinate agents. 15  Following Congressional passage of the
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations ("Guidelines") in 1991, there
has been a notable shift of liability risk away from the entity, one that
now reflects a risk disequilibrium between firms and their agents.
16
This is attributable, at least in part, to a number of strong incentives
generated by the Guidelines to push liability down to subordinate
employees. The most significant incentive may be traced to the
method by which culpability is determined and the way in which the
effectiveness of compliance is assessed. Both are simple functions of
the involvement of top management in the illegality.17
Evidence of a risk disequilibrium is seen in corporate counsel
assisting prosecutors in developing criminal cases against "wayward"
employees in an attempt to minimize allocation of liability to the
entity; elaborate and costly compliance initiatives that result in
grants of corporate amnesty or immunity by prosecutors; and
compliance programs that, in the unlikely event of a settlement or
conviction, are held out by corporations in an effort to significantly
mitigate criminal fines and, thus, losses to the firm.'8 The compliance
movement encourages prosecutors and regulators with vast discretion
to aggressively leverage indictments and convictions of subordinate
15. It will be argued that efforts to shift liability suggest that organizational compliance is
no more than strategic risk management. See infra Part II.D. This view is consistent with
Peter Cane, TORT LAW AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS 411-12 (2d ed. 1996) ('Risk management is
'loss prevention', or 'quality control'; it is a management or 'administrative' technique for
minimizing legal liability.).
16. Christopher Stone describes the balance of risk between principal and agent as the
"indemnification equilibrium." See Stone, supra note 8, at 46-49. For an excellent discussion of
risk differentials, see generally Robert M. Wiseman & Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, A Behavioral
Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 133 (1998). For a consideration
of the cost differential between principals and agents, see Kornhauser, supra note 8, at 1348-52;
Note, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of Agency, 91 YALE L.J. 168
(1981). In Part III, it is argued that the corporate compliance movement has given
organizations a prescription for criminal law immunity. This movement was prompted by
investigations of major defense contractors during the 1980s that resulted in the Defense
Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct-a set of six principles drafted by the
representatives from eighteen defense contractors that called for specific compliance procedures,
policies, and programs, e.g., codes of ethics, ethics training, and internal reporting practices. See
Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations:
Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 205 (1993).
17. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
18. See generally Edward Correia & Lee P. Breckenridge, State Enforcement and Settle-
ment Policies Regarding Internal Compliance Programs, 5 CORP. CONDUCT Q. 61 (1997);
Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L.
REV. 743 (1992).
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agents, 19 resort to civil and administrative actions against large and
medium-sized corporations in place of criminal indictments,20
compromise agent indemnification, 21 and enforce corporate self-
regulation through plea agreements. 22  In recent years, legal
strategies relying on the Guidelines have been used by corporate
counsel as both a shield and a foil to combat the near unbridled
discretion of prosecutors to force the corporate hand through the
initiation of parallel proceedings against the entity.23 All of this has
moved many large corporations to think of corporate compliance, no
less corporate ethics, as matters of risk management. 24
A discussion of the effects of the divergence of interests
between the firm and its risk-bearing agents on matters of compliance
appears in Part IV. What was once conceived of as a necessary
safeguard against the abuses of corporate power in interstate
commerce, the rise of complex corporate bureaucracies, and the
divergence of interests resulting from the separation of ownership and
control, is now a carefully conceived and arguably overpriced form of
risk management that serves an insurance function.25
19. See generally Ilise L. Feitshans, Through the Looking Glass: The Ethics of Internal
Investigations by In-House Corporate Counsel, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: HOW TO BE A GOOD
CORPORATE CITIZEN CORPORATION THROUGH SELF-POLICING, supra note 3, at 711; Joseph E.
Murphy, Handling the Risks: How to Respond to Compliance Failures, in ORGANIZING FOR
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 281; John F. Savarese & Carol Miller, Employee
Issues in Internal Corporate Investigations, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AFTER CAREMARK,
supra note 3, at 1043.
20. See MARVIN G. PICKHOLZ ET AL., GUIDE To WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
FOR THE CORPORATE COUNSELOR 119-25 (1986); Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & Stephanie A. Martz,
How Corporations Spell Relief- Substituting Civil Sanctions for Criminal Prosecution, CRIM.
JUST., Spring 1996, at 10.
21. See Modern Pressures to Cooperate with Prosecutors Almost Make 'Defending a
Corporation' Oxymoronic, Prevention of Corp. Liab. (BNA) 7 (Apr. 15, 1996).
22. See generally ALI-ABA, supra note 5; CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: HOW TO BE A GOOD
CORPORATE CITIZEN THROUGH SELF-POLICING, supra note 3.
23. The strategic use of parallel civil and criminal proceedings has been discussed at
length in Developments in the Law--Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1333-40 (1979).
24. The arguments and conclusions in this Article are far more modest yet run parallel to
the general debate over corporate judgment proofing. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996). LoPucki's thesis turns on the idea that businesses
are increasingly using judgment proofing strategies like the exploitation of the widespread
availability of credit for debtors; asset securitization; and the spreading of assets among
subsidiaries. This Article advances the notion that corporations seek to immunize themselves
by actively shifting liability down the firm's hierarchy using the institutionalization of ethics as
preventive law and a means of internal control. Moral hazards are an unintended effect of this
strategy. See supra notes 259-67 and accompanying text. For a devastating critique of
LoPucki's thesis, see James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn
LoPucki's The Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363 (1998).
25. It would be both unfair and untrue to say that only a few corporations go beyond
prophylactic compliance efforts for reasons of risk management. See Laufer & Robertson, supra
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Firms have been extraordinarily successful in shifting both the
locus of liability risk and the enforcement function down the corporate
hierarchy-all under the banner of corporate self-regulation and "good
corporate citizenship." Many corporations simply purchase only the
amount of compliance necessary to effectively shift liability away from
the firm. After risk of liability and loss is transferred, the firm's
incentive to maintain high levels of care decreases. Crimes once
imputed to the firm remain with "wayward" agents. In a light most
favorable to organizations, this has minimized agency costs by
reducing monitoring expenditures and, over time, the bonding costs
borne by agents. 26 In a more reasonable light, the rise of the "good
corporate citizenship" movement risks the creation of moral hazards
that, given equivocal evidence of compliance effectiveness,
undermines the objectives and spirit of corporate criminal law.27 The
Article concludes with a caution about the fall of vicarious liability
and the rise of the paradox of compliance, i.e., corporate compliance
that targets corporate crime may yield greater individual "white-
collar" deviance. Unfortunately, the solutions to this paradox are
limited, requiring significant constraint of prosecutorial discretion or
the discovery of reliable and valid indicators of compliance
effectiveness.
II. VICARIOUS FAULT AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
The debate over corporate liability for crimes is long-standing
and reveals, if nothing else, a remarkable ambivalence among
scholars and jurists as to how best to convey the criminal law's unique
message of condemnation to the organizational offender.28 Every so
note 5, at 1033. A significant number of surveys, however, reveal that many compliance
initiatives are not integrity-based or ethics-based. See, e.g., Mark Pastin, A Study of
Organizational Factors and Their Effect on Compliance, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 175,
177-78 (observing that 86% of his sample of 660,000 employees from 203 large companies (mean
number of employees per company equalled approximately 3,500) reported that the codes of
conduct adopted by their corporation were 'legalistic" and not effective; 69% reported that ethics
hotlines were "defensive or not effective"; 51% claimed that compliance related training was
ineffective; and 62% found the impact of the Guidelines to have a limited, insignificant, or
negative impact on compliance efforts).
26. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
27. See infra Part HI. For a review of the law as well as economics literature on moral
hazards, see generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237
(1996); John M. Marshall, Moral Hazard, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1976).
28. For well-formed, consistently critical views of corporate criminal liability, see gener-
ally Jeffrey S. Parker, Rules Without ... : Some Critical Reflections on the Federal Corporate
Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 397 (1993).
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often, commentators call for its abolition or modification because the
attribution or imputation of criminality to an entity has little if no
theoretical foundation in extant law, or is unnecessary given other
less "costly" liability regimes.29
A few recalcitrant academics have never accepted the fictional
attribution of blame, and in spite of extant law, question the need for
a debate over such an untenable anthropomorphic abstraction.30 In
commenting on the fiction of corporate criminal liability, the late
Professor Salmond once quipped: 'Ten men do not become in fact one
person, because they associate themselves together for one end, any
more than two horses become one animal when they draw the same
cart."' 31 The very idea that an inanimate entity may be charged with a
crime has prompted many to question whether corporations are
appropriately thought of as moral or legal persons.32 Consider Baron
Manwood's syllogism, "[N]one can create soules but God, but the King
creates them, and therefore they have no soules .... "33
29. See generally Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the
Model Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 21 (1957)
(' any weeds have grown on the acre of jurisprudence which has been allotted to the criminal
law. Among these weeds is . . . corporate criminal liability. . . . Nobody bred it, nobody
cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew.'); Jeffrey S. Parker, Doctrine for Destruction: The
Case of Corporate Criminal Liability, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 381 (1996).
30. See generally John Braithwaite & Brent Fisse, On the Plausibility of Corporate Crime
Theory, in 2 ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 15 (William S. Laufer & Freda Adler, eds.,
1990); Donald R. Cressey, The Poverty of Theory in Corporate Crime Research, in 1 ADVANCES IN
CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 31 (Willam S. Laufer & Freda Adler eds., 1989); V.S. Khanna, Is the
Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV.
355 (1999).
31. SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 432 (J.L. Parker ed., 9th ed. 1937); see also George F.
Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 128 (1917);
Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1916); Arthur W.
Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 266 (1911) ("But although corporate
personality is a fiction, the entity which is personified is no fiction. The union of the members is
no fiction. The acting as if they were one person is no mere metaphor. In a word, although
corporate personality is a fiction, yet it is a fiction founded upon fact.").
32. See generally John J. Flynn, The Jurisprudence of Corporate Personhood: The Misuse
of a Legal Concept, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 131 (Warren J.
Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987); Steven Walt & William S. Laufer, Why Personhood
Doesn't Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263 (1991)
(arguing that human and corporate persons are indistinguishable in law, and may be so in fact).
33. Tipling v. Pexall, 80 Eng. Rep. 1085, 1085 (K.B. 1614); see also Pharmaceutical Soc'y v.
London and Provincial Supply Ass'n, 5 App. Cas. 857, 869 (1880):
I quite agree that a corporation cannot, in one sense, commit a crime-a
corporation cannot be imprisoned, if imprisonment be the sentence for the
crime; a corporation cannot be hanged or put to death if that be the
punishment for the crime; and so, in those senses a corporation cannot
commit a crime. But a corporation may be fined, and a corporation may pay
damages....
Cf. Donald R. Richberg, The Imprisonment of Criminal Corporations, 18 CASE & COMM. 527
(1912). Is there a justification for these metaphysical musings? Corporate criminal liability
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For those commentators who allow for a corporate criminal
liability, the question most often considered is which liability regime
offers the optimal allocation of risk of financial loss and liability.14
Arguments turn on matters such as cost internalization, incentive
maintenance, inducing policing measures, and reducing sanction
costs. The objective is singular: resolve which liability regime
maximizes or enhances social welfare by minimizing the net social
costs of law violation and its prevention.35 Discussion proceeds as if
the choice is dichotomous, a decision of entity or agent liability.36 The
former is considered optimal in its ability to deter, spread risks, and
distribute losses.37 The latter is seen by some as inefficient. 3 The
two variables that largely determine an optimal allocation of liability
include the agents' and principals' perceptions or attitudes toward
bearing risk, and the relative incentives given to risk-bearing agents
to avoid criminal conduct and to their principal to engage in both
proactive and reactive diligence. 39
raises profound questions about the government's role in regulating corporations.
Jurisprudential and regulatory questions are inextricably tied to some basic concerns of
corporate-human equivalence and ontology raised by Salmond, Manwood, and Blackburn. The
reason for this rests with the highly individualistic common law requirements of the criminal
law. The individualistic nature of the criminal law has led many to ask: Should human
personhood stand as an impenetrable barrier to the attribution of criminal blame? See generally
Gilbert Geis, A Review, Rebuttal, and RecOnciliation of Cressey and Braithwaite and Fisse on
Criminological Theory and Corporate Crime, in 6 ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: THE
LEGACY OF ANOMIE THEORY 399 (Freda Adler & William S. Laufer eds., 1995).
34. See, e.g., Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 8.
35. See id. at 691. Professor Coffee states the objective clearly: "From this perspective,
the only policy issue is how heavily the law should tax the corporation in order to induce it to
monitor its agents more closely to prevent future illegality." See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does
"Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 228 (1991).
36. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 8.
37. Cf. Arlen & Carney, supra note 8, at 692.
38. See Kraakman, supra note 8, at 865.
39. In order to address apparent disincentives and inefficiencies, Arlen & Kraakman,
supra note 8, at 735, have called for mixed or multi-tiered liability regimes, incorporating
aspects of the common law rule of vicarious liability and what they call "duty-based rules"
derived from the Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. Compliant firms will have a greater
commitment to ethics, it is argued, now that there are both incentives to self-police and
appropriate residual penalties. See id. Lured by the carrot of leniency, mitigation, and perhaps
even amnesty from liability, organizations will develop clearly stated policies and procedures,
and carefully monitor and audit employee behavior. See id. at 736. Where firms fail, a residual
penalty will be assessed that makes the organization internalize the costs of undeterred
conduct. See id. This shift from vicarious liability to duty-based or mixed liability regimes
raises far-reaching questions of law and regulatory policy. Have courts departed from extant
liability rules or have prosecutors simply exploited their broad discretion to encourage corporate
admissions of guilt, voluntary disclosures, and plea agreements by holding out the prospects of a
lengthy investigation, the humiliation of an indictment, and the devastation of a possible
conviction? Has this prosecutorial discretion compensated for the inherent weakness and
inefficiencies of vicarious liability? Did the Guidelines shift discretion from judicial to
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A. Strategic Posturing
Yet absent from the scholarly consideration of human-
corporate equivalence and optimal allocation of liability are references
to the strategic efforts of corporate entities and employees to respond
to the costs of externally imposed liability regimes.40 In recounting
the history of corporate criminal liability, for example, there is scant
discussion of the internal efforts of firms to manage the risks
associated with employee deviance, and the corresponding strategies
of employees to shield themselves from liability for acts encouraged by
top management.41  Where available, the scope of such scholarship is
generally limited to enterprise liability in tort law.42 To understand
the history of corporate criminal law, however, one must consider the
emergence of vicarious liability in the context of the contemporaneous
rise of related civil law doctrines, parallel liability regimes, and
certain forms of insurance. This history reveals both internal and
external firm initiatives to manage risks.43
prosecutorial decision making? Answers to these questions, it will be argued, must consider the
compliance movement as one of the last phases in a series of phases marked by shifts of
liability, risk, and loss.
40. In its place, commentators debate the relative efficiency of liability regimes. See Arlen
& Kraakman, supra note 8.
41. An explanation of this posturing, albeit reductionist, is that firms are responding to
nothing more than defensive law practice by corporate counsel. This view could be bolstered by
tracking the evolution of corporate law departments following the advent of corporate criminal
liability. See, e.g., Joseph R. Creighton, Corporate Law Departments Adjust to Corporate
Decentralization, 16 BUS. LAW. 1004 (1961) (discussing the unique role of corporate counsel);
Richard S. Gruner, General Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs and Corporate Self-
Policing, 46 EMORY L.J. 1113 (1997); Arthur Sears Henning, Wat a Legal Department Does, 16
L. STUDENT'S HELPER 4 (1908) (describing how advances in commerce have complicated the
practice of law in corporations); Leon E. Hickman, The Emerging Role of the Corporate Counsel,
12 Bus. LAW. 216 (1957) (commenting on the evolution of corporate counsel); John M. Holcomb,
Preventive Maintenance: Using Business Strategies to Reduce Corporate Liability, PREVENTIVE
L. REP., Spring 1996 at 26; Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement: Professional
Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479 (1989); Sylvester C. Smith, Jr.,
The Changing Status of Corporate Counsel, 35 N.Y. ST. B.J. 9 (1963); Marc I. Steinberg, The
Role of Inside Counsel in the 1990s: A View from Outside, 49 SMU L. REV. 483 (1996) (discussing
the role of counsel in shaping corporate policy and strategy).
42. See generally Kraakman, supra note 8. The literature considering principal and
agency risk certainly does not extend from the genesis of liability through the effects of the
Guidelines. This is true, as well, of general treatises on corporate criminal liability. See, e.g.,
CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (1993).
43. Notably, there is insignificant literature on the external initiatives of firms through
the lobbying of legislative bodies and law reform commissions to avoid the criminal law, either
individually, by public interest organizations, or through representative trade associations. See,
e.g., Peter M. Gillon & Steven L. Humphreys, Corporate Officer Liability Under Clean Air Act
May Create Disincentives, INSIDE LITIG., May 1992, at 6 (discussing the lobbying by labor groups
that contributed to the shifting of liability onto corporate managers for criminal violations of the
Clean Air Act). According to the authors:
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Internal efforts to manage liability risk within firms have been
and are a function of corporate strategy constrained by legal
doctrine. 44  Consider Professor Christopher Stone's rendering of
enterprise liability in terms of the reciprocal risk shifting.45 According
to Stone, the firm and its agents are continually shifting the risk of
legally imposed losses back and forth.46 Agents rely on an employee's
indemnity to recover losses on account of agency.47 Conversely, the
firm depends on employer's indemnity to recoup losses imposed on it
The shifting of liability to corporate managers reflects a victory for labor
groups who lobbied hard to exempt hourly laborers and other union
members from penalties for non-compliance under the Act, even if they are
responsible for a violation .... [The amendments deliberately shift liability
for criminal violations of the statute away from employees at the operational
level or those merely 'following orders.'
Id. See generally Simeon M. Kriesberg, Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of
Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091 (1976), for an extensive consideration of the role of the
political process in shaping liability rules. Her focus on corporate criminal liability in relation to
the aborted recodification of the Federal Criminal Code is instructive. For a discussion of
changing regulatory enforcement policies, see Jed S. Rakoff, Four Postulates of White-Collar
Practice, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1993, at 3 (discussing the growing reliance on civil remedies for
white-collar and corporate crimes). Consider, for example, the move by the business lobby in the
late 1980s and early 1990s to influence the Commission's early drafts of the Guidelines. See,
e.g., Charles-Edward Anderson, Business Bashes Sentencing Plans: Sentencing Commission and
Justice Department Release Competing Proposals, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 30 (describing
response of trade associations to proposed guidelines includes their frustration that: "Neither
proposal takes into account [the situation where] a corporation has done all it can to comply
with the law and just has some aberrant, low-level employee, or people who simply don't
understand all the complicated new laws being thrown at corporations today.'!). A persistent
lobby publicly attacked the proposed fine levels, asked for the incorporation of a wide range of
mitigating circumstances, argued implicitly in favor of proportionately higher fines for small
businesses, and sought to maintain the status quo in sentencing law so that judges, rather than
prosecutors, would retain full discretion to fashion corporate sanctions. See Amitai Etzioni, A
Vote for Peer Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1991, at 13. As Amitai Etzioni concluded, the final
draft of the Guidelines became remarkably lenient "mainly because the commission bent to
heavy corporate lobbying." Id. For a critical look at how the Guidelines work against the
interests of large businesses, see generally Parker, supra note 28. Interestingly, the Sentencing
Guidelines accommodate in some significant ways for firm size. For example, firm size is
considered in determining a culpability score. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
8C2.5(14) (background) (1998) ("[A]s organizations become larger and their managements
become more professional, participation in, condonation of, or willful ignorance of criminal
conduct by such management is increasingly a breach of trust or abuse of position.'). Firm size
also affects the evaluation of a compliance program's effectiveness. See, e.g., id. at § 8A1.2(7)(I):
The requisite degree of formality of a program to prevent and detect
violations of law will vary with the size of the organization: the larger the
organization, the more formal the program typically should be. A larger
organization generally should have established written policies defining the
standards and procedures to be followed by its employees and other agents.
44. See generally Kraakman, supra note 8.
45. See Stone, supra note 8, at 45-47. For a general discussion of the reciprocity of risks,
see COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 254-69.
46. See Stone, supra note 8, at 46.
47. See id.
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through vicarious liability.48 This results in an indemnification
equilibrium, an ideal state of balance of risks governed largely by
doctrinal constraints. Professor Reinier Kraakman joins Stone in
accounting for the pervasive risk shifting within firms. The most
powerful risk shifting tool of senior management, according to
Kraakman, is the delegation of risk bearing roles, responsibilities,
and policies to subordinates. 49
From the work of Stone and Kraakman, it follows that the
balance of principal-agent liability risk is not static; rather, it evolves
over time in two distinct directions-liability toward and away from
the firm. The lesson for understanding the rise of corporate criminal
liability is that firms and their owners are strategic in shifting
liability and its attendant losses through the direct and derivative
litigation, compliance practices that assume the form of defensive risk
management, reliance on proactive legal strategies of corporate
counsel, and active lobbying of governmental bodies and commissions
in defense of business interests. Reflecting their own strategic
interests, agents have sought methods of protecting themselves from
the liability and losses that'belong to the firm, e.g., indemnification."
Stone's writing reflects a prevailing view that risk shifting has
resulted in de facto unitary liability.51 He and Professor Kraakman
observe a strong trend in the balance of risks toward enterprise
liability with culpable agents most often escaping the attribution of
criminal liability.52 While this might once have been true, and may be
48. See id.
49. See Kraakman, supra note 8, at 859. Kraakman observes, "[w]hen we allow such risk
shifting, what enforcement function remains for individual liability? Alternatively, when we
constrain individual risk shifting and compel corporate agents to bear 'absolute' personal
liability for their delicts, what enforcement advantages do we gain or lose?" Id.
50. See generally James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and
Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. SC. 1404 (1987) (arguing that managers' perceptions of risk depart from
the classical conception). For an excellent discussion of agency conflicts across the corporate
hierarchy, including those between managers and employees, as well as shareholders and
managers, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19 (1986) ("The manager, however, has no real protection against firm-
specific risk and thus will be risk averse."); Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the
Sources and Limits of Employee Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1705, 1715 (1996) ("Firms
are plagued by principal-agent problems at the level of managers and employees as well. Just
as owners' and managers' interests diverge, so do managers' and their subordinates'.'). The
idea of agent "shirking" in the absence of sufficient monitoring or bonding was advanced
recently by Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 265, 276-77 (1998).
51. See Stone, supra note 8, at 46.
52. As evidence, Stone notes an erosion of the employer's indemnity action; the expansion
of defenses grounded in the right of corporate officers to rely on records, reports, and opinion of
counsel; and the evolution of rules relating to "business judgment." Id. Kraakman concludes
that:
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true today of the "iron law of tort,"53 it fails to reflect the recent
evolution and present law of corporate criminal liability.
54
B. Strategic Phases
Contrary to Stone and Kraakman's claims of long-standing
unitary liability and the conventional wisdom of the birth of a new
draconian corporate criminal law, I argue that the recent evolution of
corporate criminal law, fashioned by the strategic posturing of
corporations, has increasingly immunized firms from the risk and
costs of criminal liability.5 5 Nowhere is this more evident than in
large corporations. There is no longer a "natural division," to use
Kraakman's words, of the entrepreneurial function into risk bearing
and management. 56 Further, any discussion of the risk of corporate
criminal liability or the loss from such liability must account for a
history dating back to the mid-1800s of active strategic risk shifting.
Over the past century, corporations became indictable persons
in the criminal law. as their power and influence began to affect
interstate commerce in ways that overwhelmed state and federal
regulatory efforts (shifting liability toward the firm). For example,
firms shared liability with their agents as railroad companies and
large industrials grew to dominate interstate commerce (sharing
liability with agents). Next, corporations protected against losses
caused by the criminal acts of employees through the purchase of
fidelity insurance (shifting losses away from the firm). Firms also
The corporation typically bears the brunt of tort damages or criminal
penalties arising out of the activities of its agents or employees. Except in
the most serious cases, culpable corporate agents are monitored and
sanctioned internally: The firm may fire, demote, or otherwise discipline
managers or employees whose actions create unacceptable legal risks.
Kraakman, supra note 8, at 859. The most incisive of all of Kraakman's observations is his
desire to see absolute liability attach to those at the apex of the corporate hierarchy-those best
equipped to deflect liability. See id.
53. Kraakman, supra note 8, at 858.
54. See generally Joseph G. Block & Nancy A. Voisin, The Responsible Corporate Officer
Doctrine-Can You Go to Jail for What You Don't Know?, 22 ENVTL. L. 1347 (1992); Richard I.
Werder, Jr., A Critical Assessment of Intracorporate Loss Shifting After Prosecutions Based on
Corporate Wrongdoing, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 36 (1993) ("[D]irectors, officers, and employees
are often finding themselves named as defendants in subsequent civil actions brought by or on
behalf of the corporation itself and not by the victim of the corporation's crime.'); Paul F.
Schaaff, Jr., Note, Indirect Criminal Conduct of Corporate Officers-Law in Search of a Fair
and Effective Standard of Liability, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 137 (1988).
55. This is, no doubt, an empirical claim. Evidence of the infrequency of criminal
indictments and convictions against large corporations is supportive. See infra note 199 and
accompanying text.
56. Kraakman, supra note 8, at 862.
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sought ways to recoup losses from director mismanagement and fraud
through derivative actions (shifting loss to agents). They actively
shifted liability to agents as the diligent "good faith" efforts of firms
were first recognized as a defense in both federal and state law
(shifting liability toward agents). Later, corporations inherited
liability from the indemnification of directors and high managerial
agents (shifting liability toward the firm). They shifted losses directly
to directors, officers, and high managerial agents through innovative
derivative actions (shifting liability toward agents). Most recently,
firms regained a near immunity to the criminal law as resource-
capable organizations institutionalize compliance for reasons of risk
management, reaping the incentives generously offered by the "good
citizen corporation" movement (shifting liability toward subordinate
agents).57
For nearly a century, during many shifts of liability risk,
courts and legislatures have embraced enforcement strategies, both
implicit and explicit, but only one liability rule: vicarious liability.5
The steadfast observation of this rule during periods when liability
was anything but vicarious suggests that it is far less important to
deliberate over optimally efficient liability regimes than it is to
consider how an invariant liability rule (vicarious liability) may be
countered and undermined by the efforts of corporations to manage
risks. Risk management avoids the harshness of the criminal law, let
alone the discretionary enforcement strategies of regulators and
prosecutors. 59
57. This is not to say that the phases in the evolution of liability are exclusive. See infra
Par I.E.
58. The application of respondeat superior to corporate criminal liability creates, in
theory, joint and several liability. This liability, according to Kraakman, "holds both the firm
and the agent responsible for crimes committed within the scope of the agent's employment."
Kraakman, supra note 8, at 859. To this day, courts have left this liability rule undisturbed.
Those commentators who refer to the Guidelines as creating a "duar' liability regime do so in
error. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 694. The duty-based regime that allegedly has
joined vicarious liability to create a dual liability is no more than an enforcement strategy. No
state or federal decision, including recent board of director liability cases, acknowledges a
competing liability regime. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
59. See generally Steven Shavell, The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given the
Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Employees, 17 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 203
(1997). Arlen and Kraakman miss the more significant meaning of the Guidelines' effect on
vicarious liability in their effort to craft a regime that maximizes social welfare. They claim
that Chapter Eight of the Guidelines "replace[s] the traditional rule imposing strict vicarious
liability on the firm for its agents' wrongdoing with a 'composite' regime in which the firm
incurs a reduced penalty if it has discharged certain compliance-related duties." Id. at 690. On
the contrary, the "duty-based" scheme suggested by the commentary of the Guidelines was not
intended (or should not have been intended) as a liability rule. As shall be argued in Part III,
using the culpability provisions of the Guidelines as a liability rule may undermine the
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Scholars wedded to agency theory and transaction cost
economics explain shifting risks of liability and loss quite simply.60
This phenomenon is further evidence of the divergent interests of
principals and agents. It cannot be doubted that owners have tried to
minimize the costs of opportunism and other conflicts of interests that
accompany agency relationships from the rise of corporate criminal
liability.61 Meanwhile, directors and managers, as undiversified risk
bearers, seek to deflect risk of liability and loss through a number of
well-known and often discussed mechanisms, including company-
sponsored indemnification and insurance. 62  Despite this, a
satisfactory discussion of corporate liability and compliance must
explain why the risks of liability and loss have shifted back and forth
during the past century between the firm and agent, recently moving
further down the corporate hierarchy. 63 Indeed, there must be an
accounting of those factors that have shifted liability risk and risk of
loss in firms at the inception of corporate criminal liability in the
early 1900s. It is with this accounting, I argue, that active risk
management and risk control are able to best explain the transition
from the ideal of theoretical risk sharing to a consistent and unequal
risk shifting from principal to agent. To focus merely on cost
corporate criminal law, as well as the objectives of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 which
gave rise to the Commission in the first place.
60. For a discussion of agency theory in relation to corporate criminal liability, see
generally Barry D. Baysinger, Organizational Theory and the Criminal Liability of
Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 341 (1991); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11; Jonathan R.
Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 315 (1991).
61. See generally Maria Moschandreas, The Role of Opportunism in Transaction Cost
Economics, 31 J. ECON. ISSUES 39 (1997) (questioning the nature of opportunism and the
efficiency of governance structures). Firms seek to align divergent interests and control the
actions of agents through contract and the reward structure, e.g., aligning managerial
incentives with the interests of the owner. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and
the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983). A combination of
managerial incentives and monitoring is seen as the best way to increase firm control over top
and middle management. See Edward J. Zajac & James D. Westphal, The Costs and Benefits of
Managerial Incentives and Monitoring in Large U.S. Corporations: When is More Not Better?, 15
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 121, 124 (Special Issue, Winter 1994); cf. Henry L. Tosi, et al.,
Disaggregating the Agency Contract: The Effects of Monitoring, Incentive Alignment, and Term
in Office on Agent Decision Making, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 584 (1997) (finding that incentive
alignment more so than monitoring prompted agents to act in the interests of owners).
62. See WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1993); Dennis J. Block et al., Indemnification and Insurance of Corporate
Officials, 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 239 (1985); Pamela H. Bucy, Indemnification of Corporate Executives
Who Have Been Convicted of Crimes: An Assessment and Proposal, 24 IND. L. REV. 279 (1991);
March & Shapira, supra note 50.
63. Recent critiques and extensions of agency theory may suggest some new and
reasonable lines of argument. See Orts, supra note 50, at 298-326; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia,
supra note 16 (challenging the restrictive risk assumptions of agency theory).
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internalization and the minimization of net social costs, as have most,
is to miss the mark. Most organizations with sufficient resources
seek cost-efficient risk management and "purchase" the amount of
compliance necessary to insure against the risk of liability to the
firm.64
C. The Idea of Liability Risk Sharing
In a convincing but incomplete attack on the assignment of
criminal blame to corporations, Jeffrey Parker notes that "corporate
criminal liability in American law is nothing more than an historical
artifact of a non-bureaucratic legal system reacting to an
industrializing economy. '65 It is the rise of industry in the late 1800s,
he says, that posed a strong challenge to courts and legislatures:
criminal law was the only available institution of public law
enforcement. In the absence of both regulatory agencies and a
substantial system of public enforcement of civil and administrative
law, the criminal law was the only available form of social control.
The alternative to corporate criminal law was regulatory inaction.66
The political, economic, and social climate at the turn of the
twentieth century would have tolerated nothing short of an expansion
of federal power and jurisdiction over interstate commerce.67 During
this time, the United States underwent a transportation revolution
with the advent of automobiles and airplanes; the electrical industry
moved across state lines allowing for the popularization of the
telephone, telegraph, and radio; powerful railroad companies
64. Cf. Sally S. Simpson, Corporate-Crime Deterrence and Corporate-Control Policies:
Views from the Inside, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED, supra note 7, at 289.
65. Parker, supra note 29, at 387.
66. See id. at 385-87. Parker underplays the legal conditions that eventually led to a
corporate criminal law. These conditions include the inaction of Congress to effectively regulate
interstate commerce; the unprecedented growth in corporations; the failure of states to combat
monopolies; and the frightening power of corporations to expand across state borders. See id.
For an excellent discussion of the failure of state initiatives to control corporate abuses, e.g.,
railroad commissions and antitrust acts, see H.L. Wilgus, Need of a National Incorporation
Law, 2 MICH. L. REV. 358 (1904) (advocating a national incorporation law). The extent of the
concern over issues of state sovereignty and unbridled corporate power is captured by William
E. Church, The Tramp Corporation, 11 AM. LAW. 13 (1903). See also Carman F. Randolph,
Considerations on the State Corporation in Federal and Interstate Relations: The Northern
Securities Cases, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 168 (1903).
67. See Jeremy Atack, Industrial Structure and the Emergence of the Modern Industrial
Corporation, in HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 428, 449 (Robert
Whaples & Dianne C. Betts eds., 1995); JAMES OLIVER ROBERTSON, AMERICA'S BUSINESS 120-87
(1985) (discussing the rise of big business in relation to the evolution of national power); Gavin
Wright, The Origins of American Industrial Success, 1879-1940, in HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, supra, at 455, 456.
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emerged; large producer-goods industrials, such as U.S. Steel and
Amalgamated Copper, secured vast power through horizontal growth;
and there was a discernible concentration of economic power as
mergers occurred and monopolies were formed.68  Commentators
obsessed over the destructive nature of these trusts and monopolies,
expressing doubts about the power of state governments without a
federal incorporation law to control the insatiable interests of
corporations. 69
Parker's conclusion would be even more persuasive had he
noted the powerful effects of vertical integration and the separation of
ownership and control on the emergence of the modern
multidivisional corporation.70 By the culmination of the first merger
wave, which ended in 1904, traditionally centralized functions in
many large corporations had become increasingly decentralized.71
Departments, managerial oversight, as well as employee functions
and roles, were highly specialized.7 2  With decentralization,
specialization, and an increasing organizational complexity came
concerns over loss of corporate control across the managerial
hierarchy (often referred to as "authority leakage"). This variable has
been used to explain organizational deviance and also to justify the
68. See MANSEL G. BLACKFORD & K. AUSTIN KERR, BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 222 (1986) ("Enormous economic growth, the rise of the first giant, vertically
integrated firms, and the spread of horizontal integration had appeared within the lifetimes of
Americans who had matured in a simpler, earlier period when the interactions of thousands of
small, independent firms governed the marketplace.'); RICHARD L. WATSON, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF NATIONAL POWER: THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1919, at 1-27 (1976); Oliver E. Williamson, The
Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1537, 1557 (1981).
For a discussion of the rise of railroad regulation, and its effects, see generally Richard Selden
Harvey, The Influence of Railroad Decisions in Corporation Law, 15 AM. LAW. 315 (1907)
(claiming that early decisional law relating to railroad "controversies" afforded courts an
opportunity to articulate general principles of corporation law); Colloquy, The Railroad Problem:
A Discussion of Current Railway Issues, 86 ANNALS 1 (1919).
69. The desirability of a new federal incorporation law was discussed extensively during
this period. See, e.g., Frederick H. Cooke, State and Federal Control of Corporations, 23 HARV.
L. REV. 456 (1910) (discussing the relative benefits of state versus federal control); Max Thelen,
Federal Incorporation of Railroads, 5 CAL. L. REV. 273 (1917) (arguing against existing plans
and proposals for a federal incorporation law); George W. Wickersham, Government Control of
Corporations, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 187 (1918) (noting the importance of both state and federal
regulatory efforts).
70. See George David Smith & Davis Dyer, The Rise and Transformation of the American
Corporation, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY 28, 40-41 (Carl Kaysen ed., 1996). For an
extensive treatment of the rise of the diversified firm, see NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL 258-94 (1990).
71. See generally HAROLD C. LIVESAY, ANDREW CARNEGIE AND THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS
(1975).
72. See Atack, supra note 67, at 431-35.
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imposition of vicarious liability.7 3 Legislators and regulators debated
which incentives or disincentives were essential to maximize law
abidance, as well as to equitably distribute risk of liability, where the
distance between a corporation's headquarters and a branch or
subsidiary operation was growing ever more vast.7 4 Of central
concern was the increasing separation in status and role of
shareholders and management. Managers with an insignificant
ownership interest assumed prominent decision-making roles as
shareholders forfeited active control over corporate operations.
Between 1850 and 1910, courts acceded to the realities of
rising monopolistic powers and rapid market integration by
expanding the fiction of corporate criminal liability.7 5 Criminal
73. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 7
(1979):
Decentralization is, almost by definition, accompanied by the establishment
of elaborate hierarchies, based on authority position and functional duties.
This allows the abdication of personal responsibility for almost every type of
decision. . . . Under these conditions almost any type of corporate
criminality, from production of faulty or dangerous products to bribery, bid-
rigging and even theft is possible.
See also Gilbert Geis, The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases of 1961, in WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME: OFFENSES IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND THE PROFESSIONS 117 (Gilbert Geis &
Robert F. Meier eds., 1977); Diane Vaughan, Toward Understanding Unlawful Organizational
Behavior, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1377, 1395 (1982) (discussing authority leakage, as well as the
effects of tall hierarchies, organizational specialization and complexity on control functions and
resulting deviance). Professor Brickey addresses the diffusion of responsibility that
accompanies the decentralization of corporations (also known as the law of diminishing control).
See Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 593, 625-26 (1988) ('These examples briefly demonstrate what management
theorists and students of bureaucracies have known for some time: '[t]he larger any
organization becomes, the weaker is the control over its actions exercised by those at the top."')
(quoting ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 143 (1967)); see also Victor H. Kramer,
Criminal Prosecutions for Violations of the Sherman Act: In Search of a Policy, 48 GEO. L.J. 530,
540 (1960) (noting that is often impossible to fix corporate criminal responsibility in
organizations in which responsibility is so diffused). An interesting parallel that may explain
the timing of the most recent fascination with corporate criminal liability is found in the wave of
corporate restructuring during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Useem observes that a central
theme of this restructuring was the decentralization of corporate authority and accountability.
Both authority and accountability are pushed downward into autonomous operating units, and
to units within units. See Michael Useem, Corporate Education and Training, in THE
AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY, supra note 70, at 292, 297.
74. See, e.g., William 0. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through
Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 195-218 (1929) (discussing the strategic use of
parent-subsidiary structure to avoid or at least minimize tort and contract liability).
75. For an early account of the importance of corporate criminal liability with particular
attention to trusts as a violation of public policy and public welfare, see Cicero J. Lindley,
Criminal Acts of Corporations and Their Punishment, 7 AM. LAW. 564, 566 (1899):
From the very nature of the organization of a corporation it is apparent that
nearly every crime known to the law can be committed by it. It may, and
frequently does, commit the crime of murder, and the crime of manslaughter
is an every day occurrence upon the part of some of the incorporated
companies of the land.
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liability, as well as the rise of civil liability regimes, simply provided
some needed relief from the risks associated with the rise of the
modern corporation. 76 The emergence of multidivisional large-scale
organizations, the move from horizontal to vertical integration, the
separation of corporate ownership and control, and the rising
prominence of railroad conglomerates in interstate commerce led
Congress and then federal courts to implement the power of the
criminal law as a regulatory weapon. 7  Courts first extended the
criminal law to corporations for crimes of nonfeasance, and then for
crimes of misfeasance in which no intent was required.78 Finally,
For a discussion of these early cases, see KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY: A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS, THEIR OFFICERS AND
AGENTS 1-37 (1984).
76. See Brent Fisse, The Duality of Corporate and Individual Criminal Liability, in
CORPORATIONS AS CRIMINALS 69, 69-80 (Ellen HochStedler ed., 1984) (describing the main
reasons why both entity and individual liability exist); cf. KIP SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR
CORPORATE CRIMINALS 85-86 (1990) (discussing Fisse's justifications); see also RICHARD S.
GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING 76-77 (1994) (noting that "corporate criminal
liability, like the corporation itself, is no more than a convenient legal fiction. Such liability is
recognized because it serves public policy and for no other reason.'); Albert W. Alschuler,
Ancient Law and the Punishment of Corporations: Of Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 307, 313 (1991):
It is too late to reconsider the error that the Supreme Court made in 1909;
corporate criminal responsibility is here to stay. Nevertheless, we should
recognize the beast for what it is-not criminal punishment as we
customarily understand punishment -but a form of instrumental regulation
with which ordinary principles'of culpability do not fit.
See also John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 448 (1981); William S. Laufer,
Culpability and the Sentencing of Corporations, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1049 (1992) (arguing that the
substantive corporate law has been outdone by principles of liability derived from the
Sentencing Guidelines); Mueller, supra note 29, at 40 ("As a matter of convenience and
expediency the law thinks of the corporation as the operating concern in terms of a man-like
phenomenon.').
77. See, e.g., Smith & Dyer, supra note 70, at 40-41; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical
Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1627-49 (1988) (discussing critical
factors and forces responsible for the evolution of the modern corporation at the turn of the
century).
78. For a pre-Hudson discussion of the emerging principles of corporate criminal liability,
see Charles G. Little, Punishment of a Corporation - The Standard Oil Case, 3 U. ILL. L. REV.
446, 447 (1909). Early scholarship questioned the need for a corporate criminal law. See George
F. Canfield, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 469, 481 (1914):
Our final conclusion, therefore, is that, notwithstanding this or similar
statutory provisions, a corporation, according to sound theory and the
general principles of the law of corporations, is not indictable for any crimes
except those for which if committed on behalf of or under the general
direction of an individual or partnership, such individual or a member of
such partnership, although innocent, would be indictable.
See also Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 832-36 (1927)
(considering the benefits and drawbacks of corporate criminal liability); Joseph F. Francis,
Criminal Responsibility of the Corporation, 18 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 323 (1924) (concluding that
"[u]ntil and unless it is demonstrated that the social good demands that corporations be held
1999] PARADOX OF COMPLIANCE 1363
with the watershed case of New York Central & Hudson River
Railroad Co. v. United States in 1909, the corporate criminal law was
applied to crimes of intent.7 9
This view that the extension of criminal liability was an
artifact of a non-bureaucratic legal system responding to the rise of
corporate power is strongly supported by Hudson.0 The United
States sought criminal penalties against the New York Central &
Hudson River Railroad Company for the acts of an assistant traffic
manager who illegally offered rebates to preferred customers. The
briefs submitted to the Court by the Government make clear the
practical importance of a vicarious liability for corporations.8 1
Prosecutors argued persuasively that agents are vested with
corporate powers, and that where and when they act on behalf of the
principal within their authority it is as though the corporation itself
has acted.8 2
The Court did not struggle with this agency argument, or with
the notion that corporations must share in the risks of conducting
business by internalizing the costs for the wrongdoing of their
agents. 83  Given the prominence of corporations in interstate
responsible for crimes, there is no sound reason for so holding them.'); Ervin Hacker, The Penal
Ability and Responsibility of the Corporate Bodies, 14 J. AM. INST. op CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
91, 96-101 (1923) (debating the virtues of corporate criminal liability); Frederic P. Lee,
Corporate Criminal Liability, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16-24 (1928) (presenting one of the first
critical examinations of corporate liability rules). The history of corporate criminal liability has
been discussed at length elsewhere. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal
Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393 (1982); V.S. Khanna,
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996). A
discussion of the historical antecedents of the expansion of corporate criminal liability is a high
point in Khanna's otherwise dismissive discussion of the value of a corporate criminal law. See
Khanna, supra, at 1479-88.
79. New York Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
80. See id. at 494.
81. "If punishment for such payments when prohibited by law can be administered only on
proving authorization from the president or directors no railway corporation can ever be legally
punished for such payments. But, on the other hand, if a railroad corporation may be made
criminally responsible for the acts of its officers or agents, to whom have been delegated power
to control its corporate action within the sphere represented by the transaction then no case can
more completely show ground for liability than the case at bar." Brief for the United States at
14-15, Hudson (No. 57).
82. This argument was made much earlier in state cases. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Pulaski County Agric. & Mechanical Ass'n, 17 S.W. 442, 442 (Ky. 1891) ("With the growth of
corporations came the necessity for this rule [corporate criminal liability], and its adaptability to
changed circumstances is an excellence of the common law .... The object should be to reach
and punish the real power in the matter, and thus prevent a repetition of the offense.').
83. The Court reasoned that the doctrine of respondeat superior in tort law supplied the
necessary ingredients for a vicarious criminal liability. As the Court stated:
Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther in
holding that the act of the agent, while exercising the authority delegated to
him to make rates for transportation, may be controlled, in the interest of
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commerce, their immense potential to do wrong, and the absence of
other regulatory mechanisms, a powerful deterrent would have been
lost by restricting criminal liability to agents.84 Individuals and
organizations, it seemed, had few incentives without the prospect of
vicarious liability. 5 With joint and several liability, however, both the
principal and its agents have a distinct risk of liability and, from this,
a reciprocal incentive for law abidance. 86
The simple-minded public policy that emerged in Hudson
seemed ideal in its shared allocation of risks to both principal and
agent.8 7  Corporate liability deters crime; it moves the risk of loss
away from risk averse officers and directors toward the firm; it
efficiently distributes liability risk between the firm and employees. 8
Without significant entity liability or even shared liability, some
argued, incentives would be seen as too weak to ensure an
organizational commitment to law abidance.8 9 As one commentator
public policy, by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties
upon the corporation for which he is acting in the premises.
Hudson, 212 U.S. at 494. The issue of internalizing costs was disposed of as a matter of policy.
See id. at 495 ('If [corporate criminal liability] were not so, many offenses might go unpunished
and acts be committed in violation of law, where, as in the present case, the statute requires all
persons, corporate or private, to refrain from certain practices forbidden in the interest of public
policy.").
84. The Court went so far as to say that "[iut would be a distinct step backward to hold
that Congress cannot control those who are conducting this interstate commerce by holding
them responsible for the intent and purposes of the agents to whom they have delegated the
power to act in the premises." Id. at 496. See generally Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The
Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accounta-
bility, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468 (1988).
85. See Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in
Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 433 (1963) ("The case for corporate
criminality rests presumably upon the inadequacy of the threat of personal conviction upon the
individual actors."). For a recent case that refers to the importance of incentives in vicarious
liability, see United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d 961, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
86. See Kraakman, supra note 8, at 858-59.
87. The discussion of agency issues in relation to criminal liability assumes that both
principal and agent are utility maximizers. All other contract assumptions apply as well, such
as the importance of the equity contract, limited liability, and diversified investment portfolios
as risk bearing devices for shareholders. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11 (dis-
cussing the importance of market and contract controls that are designed, at least in theory, to
align the divergent interests of owners and managers).
88. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 8, at 700; Macey, supra note 60, at 319.
89. Courts find corporations criminally liable for the conduct of employees acting within
the scope of employment, with an intent to benefit the corporation. The doctrine of respondeat
superior, derived from tort law, views corporations as principals, and officers, directors, and
employees as agents. Resort to vicarious liability is justified on at least two grounds. First,
there is convenience and expediency. Second, there is an assumption that it allocates risks and
economic losses efficiently. See H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Corporationsfor the Acts of Their Employees and Agents, 41 LOY. L. REV. 279, 280-308 (1995). For a
discussion of models of regulation that extend well beyond vicarious liability, see generally IAN
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concluded, "[c]orporate criminal responsibility tends to prevent crime
not only by influencing the corporation's representatives of all degrees
to abstain from conducting its business in unlawful ways, but also by
influencing those of higher or more remote degree to restrain
subordinates. 90
In theory, vicarious liability should align organizational
incentives (e.g., increases in payroll compensation, significant
bonuses, and promotion to higher positions in the corporation) with
corporate policies, codes, standards, and procedures. Top
management must be put on notice that entity liability is likely where
incentives are outdone by implicit messages to deviate from the law.
Successful managers must institutionalize an adequate control
system to identify deviance, exercise great care in the delegation of
significant corporate responsibility, and clearly communicate the
importance and relevance of policies, code provisions, standards, and
procedures, while defining those acts that are within the scope of an
agent's authority.91
The scholarly response to Hudson was scarcely favorable.
Unlike the application of vicarious tort liability, which seems to have
been accepted uncritically, commentators, law reform commissions,
and corporations all sensed the distinct limitations of a fictionally
imputed fault in the criminal law.92 First, the rationale for extending
AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION (1992); John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-
Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1982).
90. See Edgerton, supra note 78, at 835. In Edgerton's insightful comment he observes
that vicarious liability
supplies the stockholder with a strong motive for seeing that its business is
lawfully conducted. Similarly, directors, managers and superior agents are
necessarily more inclined to encourage or ignore criminality on the part of
their subordinates, when the subordinates alone are subject to punishment,
than when their crimes involve a risk of injury to the corporation, and
through it to the directors and managers themselves.
Id. To illustrate the proper use of a vicarious criminal liability, Lee pointed to the case of
Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 75 P. 924 (Colo. 1904). In Overland there was a joint
criminal indictment of the company and an assistant supervisor. The latter had delegated
authority to hire a new employee to a subordinate, who violated child labor laws. See id. at 925-
26.
91. A corporation risks liability where its agent acts within the scope of her authority and
for the benefit of the corporation. Where acts fall outside the boundary of the employee's
authority, or are solely for her personal benefit, liability remains exclusively with the agent.
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128-29 (5th Cir. 1962) (reversing
conviction of corporation where there was evidence that employees acts did not benefit their
employers); cf. Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir. 1945) ('We do
not accept benefit as a touchstone of corporate criminal liability; benefit, at best, is an
evidential, not an operative, fact.").
92. For a consideration of vicarious liability in tort law, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden
and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1744-45
(1996):
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principles of respondeat superior to corporate criminal liability
appeared shallow and inadequate. As Professor G.O.W. Mueller has
noted: "It is safe to say that, for the most part, the law has proceeded
without rationale whatsoever-particularly in the area of regulatory
and absolute liability offenses. It simply rests on an assumption that
such liability is a necessary and useful thing."93 Notably, it has been
argued that the necessity for a fictional attribution of criminal
liability diminished as the federal regulatory state emerged toward
the middle of the twentieth century.94 Corporations were increasingly
regulated and frequently sanctioned, both administratively and with
civil judgments. 95 Surely Mueller would not be alone in asking the
obvious question: Is a corporate criminal law necessary?96
In regard to cases in which an agent's actions are attenuated
from the corporate policy or standards, organizations were subjected
to an unnecessarily harsh form of strict liability.97 Commentators
reasoned that firms are less culpable when a rogue employee acts
contrary to a company policy implemented in good faith.98  Yet there
But despite all the debate and legislative action involved in tort reform, no
attention has been paid to employer vicarious liability. No business group
has suggested that the doctrine be reviewed and no legislature has
considered its modification or repeal. Insofar as academic writings exert
some influence on the legislative agenda, no scholars have written articles
that have called into question the wisdom of vicarious liability in tort.
Id. at 1744-45. The general rule is that "the employer should be liable for those faults that may
fairly be regarded as risks of his business, whether they are committed in furthering it or not." 5
FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., LAW OF TORTS 40-41 (2d ed. 1986). Recently, the Supreme Court
extolled the virtues of the doctrine of respondeat superior in holding that employers are liable
for a hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate authority over a victimized
employee. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, _U.S._, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
93. Mueller, supra note 29, at 23. For a similar critique of corporate criminal liability by
reporters for the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07
commentary at 146 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955) ("The modern development, however, has
proceeded largely without reference to any intelligible body of principle and the field is
characterized by the absence of articulate analysis of the objectives thought to be attainable by
imposing criminal fines on corporate bodies.").
94. See Khanna, supra note 78, at 1487.
95. See, e.g., CLINARD, supra note 73 (detailing the civil, administrative, and criminal
liability of 582 of the largest publicly owned corporations in the United States).
96. See generally Khanna, supra note 78.
97. See Note, Indemnification of the Corporate Official for Fines and Expenses Resulting
from Criminal Antitrust Litigation, 50 GEO. L.J. 566, 567 (1962); see also Kraakman, supra
note 8, at 859. It is of some interest that at least initially, the concern was with the unfair
attribution of liability to the entity or the agent. Consider, for example, Lee's discussion of
subordinate employees suffering exclusive liability for the crimes of superior officers. See Lee,
supra note 78, at 21-22.
98. See, e.g., Note, Criminal Liability of Corporations for Acts of Their Agents, 60 HARV. L.
REV. 283, 286 (1946) (arguing that corporate criminal liability risks loss of public good will
because the stigma of a corporate conviction will have little meaning if there is evidence of a
good faith effort of the organization to ensure law abidance). According to Coffee, a corporation
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is the problem that, under a strict regime of vicarious liability, much
of a firm's incentive to maintain the monitoring and self-policing of
employees comes from a fear of entity liability notwithstanding the
organization's compliance efforts. 99
The premise of a shared risk seems to have been more
apparent than real. The notion of risk sharing is often eroded by
strong incentives to quietly discipline or terminate wayward
employees so that a strict imputation of liability might be avoided. I°
Detecting employee misconduct subjects the corporation to incrimi-
nation and, thus, to a tax.10 1 An awareness of this problem emerged
immediately after Hudson as corporations considered the expenditure
of their enforcement costs. 10 2 Professor Arlen was the first to make
the incisive observation that,
[i]f the expected cost to the corporation of the resulting increase in
its expected criminal liability exceeds the expected benefit to the
corporation of the reduction in the number of crimes, a corporation
subject to strict vicarious liability will not respond by increasing its
enforcement expenditures because additional enforcement would
only increase the firm's expected criminal liability.'
Predictably, some rational corporations chose to avoid the
reach of vicarious liability by obscuring illegalities, 0 4 asking courts to
that has engaged in a diligent, albeit unsuccessful, effort to prevent law violations should
receive sentencing considerations instead of an affirmative defense. See Coffee, supra note 76,
at 445-46.
99. See Laufer, Integrity, supra note 7, at 176.
100. On the one hand, increased enforcement expenditures reduce the number of
agents who commit crimes by increasing the probability of detection and
thus each agent's expected cost of crime. On the other hand, these
expenditures also increase the probability that the government will detect
those crimes that are committed, thereby increasing the corporation's
expected criminal liability for those crimes .... [A] corporation subject to
vicarious liability may spend less on enforcement than it would absent
vicarious liability.
Arlen, supra note 2, at 836
101. See id. at 834-36; David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit
Immunity, 81 IOWA L. REV. 969, 970 (1996) ("[Commentators stress that corporations may
forego internal audits if they fear that they will be held liable for, and hence punished for, any
violations that they might uncover.").
102. This appears to be a classic risk tradeoff. See generally RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS
IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener
eds., 1995).
103. Arlen, supra note 2, at 836.
104. See, e.g., C.Y. Cyrus Chu & Yingyi Qian, Vicarious Liability Under A Negligence Rule,
15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 305, 306 (1995) ("[Ihe principal has an incentive to hide the evidence,
or to collude with the agent, to avoid their joint and several liability.).
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consider good faith efforts to prevent illegal activity, 10 5 exploiting the
fact that liability is restricted to the illegal acts of more significant
corporate actors 106 and, as shall be discussed below, shifting losses
away from the firm.
D. The Emergence of Corporate Risk Shifting
1. Due Diligence and Good Faith
The first evidence of a disavowal of vicarious liability was
marked by a judicial recognition of an organization's good faith efforts
to abide by the law. Only four years after Hudson was decided,
corporations were asking courts to consider the complexity of the
corporate form, the critical importance of clearly stated firm policies
prohibiting unethical and illegal acts, and the good faith efforts of
firms to ensure compliance with the law. 107 To be sure, not all courts
responded by ruling that corporations are absolved of liability or are
due less blame when their agents engage in criminal acts against
express instructions. In fact, a number of courts went so far as to
hold entities liable when not a single employee was to blame. 08
Even so, in the series of cases that followed Hudson, the
application of vicarious liability was limited where the rule as applied
was harsh-where the rule, as one court observed, "would carry
corporate responsibility beyond ... the boundary to which we think
105. See Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 1257 ("A new system of corporate
liability based on the reasonableness of the corporation's practices and procedures to avert
illegal conduct would better reflect the blameworthiness of the corporation as an entity.).
106. Liability was restricted to high managerial agents for certain crimes under a regime
proposed by the Model Penal Code. See generally Brickey, supra note 73.
107. See John Gund Brewing Co. v. United States, 204 F. 17 (8th Cir.), modified, 206 F. 386
(8th Cir. 1913). For a discussion of Gund and the advent of the due diligence defense, see
Brown, supra note 89, at 309-12.
108. See, e.g., AMA v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941); United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31
F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1929). Courts inconsistently ruled on matters of acting on express instructions
or corporate policy. See United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.
1978); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v.
Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342, 343-44 (3d Cir. 1948) ('CThe employer 'does not rid himself of that
duty because the extent of the business may preclude his personal supervision, and compel
reliance on subordinates. He must then stand or fall with those whom he selects to act for him.'"
(quoting People v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 121 N.E. 474 (N.Y. 1918))); James V.
Dolan & Richard S. Rebeck, Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Acts in Violation of Company
Policy, 50 GEo. L.J. 547 (1962). The drafters of the MPC discussed this issue extensively. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 commentary at 14 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
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corporate criminal responsibility should be carried."'10 9 Some courts
expressed a particular sympathy with the realities of corporate life.
For example, in United States ex rel. Porter v. Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co., Circuit Judge Major acknowledged that, "[a]s the
magnitude of a business increased, with its personal supervision
further removed, we apprehend that the difficulties were corre-
spondingly enhanced. Certainly 100% compliance could not be
expected in any event; in fact, it would be impossible."' 0 Authors of
popular treatises in the early 1900s noted a particular sympathy to a
corporation's diligence as well."'
Drafters of the Model Penal Code ('CMPC") seemed to have been
unconcerned that good faith compliance efforts might compromise the
incentives derived from vicarious liability.1 2 They concluded that if
sanctions were designed to encourage the reasonable supervision of
employees, then failing to reward genuinely diligent compliance
efforts would be a distinct disincentive, undermining the deterrent
value of any fine or period of probation.1 3 In 1962, the American Law
Institute ("ALI") codified in the MPC a narrowly drafted due diligence
defense for all state regulatory offenses designed to "encourage
diligent supervision of corporate personnel by managerial employees
in those cases in which the corporation is bound by the conduct of
inferior personnel."11 4 In a host of states, corporate exculpation
109. Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, 158 F.2d 2, 8 (6th Cir. 1946); see also United
States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 572 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[The existence of such
instructions and policies~if any be shown, may be considered by you in determining whether the
agents, in fact, were acting to benefit the corporation.'); United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871,
878 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[A] corporation may be liable for acts of its employees done contrary to
express instructions and policies, but that the existence of such instructions and policies may be
considered in determining whether the employee in fact acted to benefit the corporation.") (second
emphasis added); Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d at 1007 (policy statements and specific instructions
along with appropriate enforcement would give organization immunity from the criminal law).
110. United States ex rel. Porter v. Kroger Govery & Baking Co., 163 F.2d 168, 177 (7th
Cir. 1947). It is notable that a due diligence defense was raised in the Electrical Antitrust
cases. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,699, at
76,759 (E.D. Pa. 1960). The Chairman of the Board of Directors of General Electric, Ralph
Cordiner, was reported to have said that compliance with corporate directives for employees on
antitrust legislation should provide a defense to corporate liability. See Dolan & Rebeck, supra
note 108, at 548 n.5 (citing R. Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy, FORTUNE, May 1961,
at 161, 164).
111. See, e.g., FLOYD R. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 562 (3d ed. 1923)
( The principal will not ordinarily be held criminally responsible for the crimes of his agent or
servant, unless he has in some way directed, participated in, or approved the act.'); SEYMOUR D.
THOMPSON, 7 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 5645 (3d ed. 1927).
112. See generally Herbert Weschsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States:
The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425 (1968).
113. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, supra note 93.
114. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 commentary at 154, supra note 93. Due diligence is
conceived of as an affirmative defense. See id. at § 2.07 commentary at 154. Notably, the
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follows the showing of due diligence by the supervisor of the wayward
agent. 115 In cases that once met the standards of vicarious liability,
courts following the MPC upheld the convictions of culpable agents
with the caveat that: "[t]o impose criminal liability on the corporation
.. would amount to a strict criminal liability in the absence of proof
of fault."1 6
The recognition of the importance of organizational due
diligence should have raised serious questions about the risk of
diminishing the incentives driving principles of vicarious fault."7 In
cases where prosecutors and courts are hard-pressed to determine the
effectiveness or authenticity of compliance efforts, a good faith
defense would tend to absolve the entity, perhaps without
justification. 1 8  Further, a due diligence defense corrodes the
principles of delegation and authority that are at the foundation of a
consensual agency relationship. 19 Organizations delegate authority to
agents who act on their behalf as their representatives. The failure of
an agent to perform as instructed is incidental to an organization's
National Commission on the Reform of the Federal Criminal Code, known as the Brown
Commission, specifically rejected this defense. See STAFF MEMORANDA ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CRIMES INVOLVING CORPORATIONS AND OTHER ARTIFICIAL ENTITIES 172 (1969) (on file with
author). For a discussion of the treatment of corporate criminal liability by the Brown
Commission, see Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability, 68 NW. U. L. REV. 870, 877-92 (1973).
115. In any prosecution of a corporation or an unincorporated association for the
commission of an offense included within the terms of Subsection (1)(a) or
Subsection (3)(a) of this Section, other than an offense for which absolute
liability has been imposed, it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a
preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having
supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed
due diligence to prevent its commission.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(5) (1962)For a detailed discussion of the adoption of this due
diligence defense, see generally Brickey, supra note 73.
116. See State v. Abboud, Inc., No. 68611, 1995 WL 680920, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
Though there was no mention of the MPC's due diligence defense, the Supreme Court's decision
last term in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton sought to avoid a strict form of vicarious employer
liability in Title VII cases where victims are subjected to a hostile environment. Justice Souter
articulated an affirmative defense having two elements: "(a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998).
117. See Laufer, Integrity, supra note 7, at 171-77.
118. See GRUNER, supra note 76, at 344-47.
119. The notion of delegated authority is critical. See, e.g., C.I.T. Corp. v. United States,
150 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1945) ('It is the function delegated to the corporate officer or agent which
determines his power to engage the corporation in a criminal transaction.'); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958) ("Agency is the fiduciary relation which results
from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf
and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.'). For an extension of the legal
conception of agency theory, see Orts, supra note 50, at 273.
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diligent efforts to prevent such failures. 120 Surely, some rational
corporations will find less of an incentive to fashion effective
compliance programs as their liability will be excused regardless of
the success of compliance efforts. 121
Although most prosecutors consider the diligent efforts of
corporations in deciding whether to investigate, charge, and pursue
an aggressive prosecution, those who do do not raise reasonable
concerns. According to the Chief of the Department of Justice's
Antitrust Division, the concern in crediting failed programs is that
"there would be less incentive for companies to make sure these
programs work, to refine the programs, and to make them effective.
The ultimate goal, after all, is a compliance program that prevents
crimes, not one that excuses the corporation in the event that one
occurs."1 22  For some state and federal prosecutors, no evidence of
diligence on the part of a company can shield the principal from the
acts of the wayward agent. Here liability is absolute, the miscreant
agent simply acts and speaks for the principal in the commission of a
crime. 123
Recognition of organizational due diligence as a defense allows
organizations with ineffective, skeletal compliance initiatives to
strategically shift blame to their agents and unjustifiably escape a
120. See Recent Case, Corporations-Powers and Liabilities-Criminal Responsibility for
Act of Agent, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 557, 557-58 (1947) (arguing this point but conceding that, "[ilt is
not, however, clearly settled whether a corporation may be indicted for a crime committed by its
agents within the scope of his authority but without the knowledge of the corporation or against
its instructions).
121. This is the position taken by the Antitrust Division of the United States Department
of Justice. See, e.g., Robert E. Bloch, Compliance Programs and Criminal Antitrust Litigation: A
Prosecutor's Perspective, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 223 (1988).
122. Gary R. Spratling, The Experience and Views of the Enforcement Community, in
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 317, 319. It is unclear how the Antitrust Division's Amnesty
Program is consistent with Mr. Spratling's position. According to the most recent Division
policy, amnesty from federal prosecution for antitrust violations is automatic "if a corporation
comes forward before our investigation begins ...." Id. at 321. See also "Front End"Benefits of
Antitrust Compliance Program, Self-Reporting Offer Best Hope of Avoiding Fine Floor,
Prevention of Corp. Liab. (BNA) 10 (Apr. 15, 1996).
123. For a discussion of this point in relation to vicarious liability, see Brickey, supra note
73, at 628-29 ("Under the respondeat superior rule, if the corporation has entrusted the
miscreant agent with responsibility for the function he is performing, he is deemed to act and
speak for the corporation when he unlawfully transacts its business.'); GRUNER, supra note 76,
at 346-47. A different argument was made in Developments in the Law:
Both the moral quality of the new system and its value as a deterrent
depend largely on what courts require for a corporate due diligence defense.
If the defense is extremely difficult to meet, it becomes identical in practice
to the system of respondeat superior, and its moral quality is diminished. If
the defense is too easily satisfied, liability becomes easily evaded and its
deterrent effectiveness is destroyed.
Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 1257 n.72
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strict imputation of fault. 124 Professor Coffee acknowledges this
concern in cases where corporations are most interested in the
cosmetic appearance of compliance. 125 This concern also extends to
organizations that are indifferent to an effective compliance program
and culture. 126 Survey research, for instance, suggests that in some (if
not many) corporations, the role of compliance has more to do with
maintaining the appearance of a compliant reputation than that of a
meaningful culture of ethical awareness and law abidance. 27 Codes
of conduct are often disregarded as 'legalistic and one-sided.' ' 28
Compliance also may be seen as a concession to regulators for some
deference to the entity with a prospective or pending investigation,
charging decision, or plea bargain. 29 In short, the strategic utility of
124. See Spratling in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 303. According to Spratling, to give
weight to compliance efforts would: (a) serve to encourage and reward the creation of pro forma,
prophylactic programs, (b) create a category of excuses and justifications that are not
warranted, (c) undermine the deterrent ability of due diligence, (d) be inconsistent with
principles of vicarious liability, and (e) add disparity to prosecutorial decision-making. See id.;
see also James F. Rill, The Importance of Deterring Antitrust Crime: Corporate Compliance
Programs and Federal Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks at the Symposium on Antitrust and
Association Law, Bar Association of the District of Columbia, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 20, 1992);
cf. United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 572 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussing how
compliance initiatives may determine whether agents were acting with an intent to benefit the
corporation); United States v. Greyhound Corp., 508 F.2d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 1974) ("[A]ctions
showing a good faith effort to comply with the order will tend to negate willfulness .... ',).
125. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 229 ('In fact, if corporate penalties were greatly reduced
to reflect the adoption of corporate compliance plans or other monitoring systems, corporations
would rationally develop an interest in cosmetic monitoring-so that they could both benefit
from illegal behavior and also incur only modest penalties, if apprehended.').
126. See, e.g., Neil S. Cartusciello, The Con Edison Case & Emerging Principles of
Corporate Prosecution, Bus. CRIMES BULL., May 1995, at 1 (discussing the revelations regarding
corporate culture at Con Edison).
127. See, e.g., Richard S. Gruner, Compliance Programs and Corporate Liability: A Look
Into the Future, in ,CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: CAREMARK AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF GOOD
CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note 3, at 199, 205 (footnote omitted):
Compliance programs that are treated by management as a sham tend to
encourage cynicism by employees. Such cynicism, in turn, tends to cause
employees to pay less attention to legal requirements and to be more willing
to commit offenses. Hence, a poor law compliance program may actually
increase levels of offenses, making it worse than doing nothing.
128. Pastin, supra note 25, at 175, 177-78 ("Codes of conduct viewed by employees as
legalistic and one-sided, i.e., in favor of the company, increased the likelihood that employees
would exhibit behavior that they identified as unethical or illegal.... Our summary reading of
the results of this study is that many compliance measures being taken by companies have no
effect of [sic] a negative effect on the compliance environment of the company.'). See infra notes
235-46 and accompanying text
129. See F. Joseph Warin & Jason C. Schwartz, Deferred Prosecution: The Need for
Specialized Guidelines for Corporate Defendants, 23 J. CORP. L. 121, 123-32 (1997) (discussing
the initiation or declination of prosecution based on compliance efforts in four companies).
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compliance standards may be far greater than any sort of
organizational integrity.130
2. High Managerial Agents
MPC drafters further shifted the risk of liability for non-
regulatory crimes away from the entity by limiting corporate liability
to actions taken by high managerial agents. 1 1 The objective was to
restrict entity liability to those situations in which members of the
board of directors, corporate officers, or agents sufficiently high in the
corporate hierarchy engaged in criminal acts. Such acts were seen as
reflective of the character of the corporate body. The drafters
acknowledged that this rule was a partial rejection of the general
respondeat superior approach adopted by federal courts, preserving it
for situations in which shareholders are well positioned to indirectly
prevent corporate crime.132 This stands in sharp contrast to the
federal law. Prevailing federal law, in its application of fault through-
out the corporate hierarchy, suggests that liability does not arise out
of any particular relation between the entity and the agent, but that it
is found in the organization's duty toward the public. 33 Thus, under
the MPC, corporations stand or fall by the choices of their agents.
130. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-
Apr. 1994, at 106, 106:
Prompted by the prospect of leniency, many companies are rushing to
implement compliance-based ethics programs. Designed by corporate
counsel, the goal of these programs is to prevent, detect, and punish legal
violations. But organizational ethics means more than avoiding illegal
practice; and providing employees with a rule book will do little to address
the problems underlying unlawful conduct.
131. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1962) ("A corporation may be convicted of the
commission of an offense if: the commission of the offense was authorized, requested,
commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial
agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment.'); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 commentary at 151 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
132. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.07 commentary at 151 (Tentative Draft No. 4 1955)
The general respondeat superior approach of paragraph a is rejected for
these cases, and corporate liability is confined to situations in which the
criminal conduct is performed or participated in by the board of directors or
by corporate officers and agents sufficiently high in the hierarchy to make it
reasonable to assume that their acts are in some substantial sense reflective
of the policy of the corporate body.
133. The best illustration of this is where courts have found corporate criminal liability for
a breach of a non-delegable duty. In such cases, corporations have been estopped from
attributing a breach of statutory duty to subordinate employees or, for that matter, from
claiming organizational diligence, because the duty cannot be delegated. See United States v.
illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 303 U.S. 239, 244 (1938) (finding that a statutory duty to unload cattle
was owed to public at large, and could not be avoided by delegation to subordinate employees);
United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342, 343-44 (3d Cir. 1948) (deciding that good faith
precautions did not overcome non-delegable duty); United States v. E. Brooke Matlock, Inc., 149
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The effect of this partial rejection by the MPC, however, did
more than just renounce the harshness of vicarious liability. By
limiting liability in cases where owners, officers, directors, and those
responsible for the construction of corporate policies had no
knowledge of the illegality, these new liability rules afforded
organizations protection from criminal liability for acts of deliberate
indifference by high managerial agents. 13 4 Of far greater concern, the
MPC rules offered a marginal incentive to high managerial agents to
delegate tasks and responsibilities to their subordinates in an
indifferent, negligent, even reckless manner. As one commentator
noted, senior management "can protect themselves from knowledge-
and the corporation from liability-simply by delegating to
subordinates full responsibility for those activities which might result
in criminal violations.' 135
By insulating senior officers and managers from liability, and
encouraging the delegation of risk bearing activities, the risk of
liability is shifted further down the corporate hierarchy. Kraakman
noted this effect in observing that "managers and directors enjoy de
facto insulation from liability-even apart from risk-shifting agree-
ments-because of the organizational buffer between themselves and
lower-level employees who implement their decisions.' ' 36 This shift
F. Supp. 814, 820 (D. Md. 1957) (holding that corporations cannot avoid liability by claiming
that a subordinate neglected his duty). Comments from reporters to the Brown Commission
made explicit reference to this case in justifying the adoption of the Federal Rule, and rejecting
the MPC liability rule; see also S. REP. No. 96-553, at 79-83 (1980).
134. See Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 1254 ("Consequently, liability can be
evaded whenever illegal activity occurs without the authorization or reckless toleration of top
officials. Since an executive cannot authorize or recklessly tolerate an offense unless he knows
about it, a corporation can escape liability under this system as long as high officials remain
ignorant of illegal activity.").
135. Id. (borrowing language from United States v. Van Riper, 154 F.2d 492, 493 (3d Cir.
1946)). Similarly, Dolan and Rebeck have reasoned
[I]f courts were to draw a distinction between the corporation's officers and
its ordinary agents, imputing the criminal intent of only the former to the
corporation, the corporation could then completely immunize itself from
penal punishment for its crimes by simply delegating the officer's
responsibility for those acts which might be performed in an illegal manner
to agents below the officer level.
Dolan & Rebeck, supra note 108, at 552. Similar concerns were raised in United States v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 661 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Were we to import
'reasonable diligence' into the law of criminal contempt, corporations could more easily distance
themselves from the wayward acts of their agents-a prospect that threatens the very authority
of the court that criminal contempt is designed to preserve.").
136. Kraakman, supra note 8, at 860 n.9 (emphasis added). From a pre-Sentencing
Guidelines view, one commentator has reasoned:
When faced with a criminal investigation, corporate personnel tend to close
ranks out of loyalty or through fear of dismissal. If they do, the result may
be de facto immunity against individual criminal liability, at least for highly
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has been profound in large multidivisional entities where decision
making is both decentralized and delegated to empowered sub-
ordinate employees. 137
The consequences of this shift, as significant as they are,
cannot be fully understood without considering the rise of
intracorporate loss shifting mechanisms, such as director and officer
indemnification, and employee fidelity insurance. As the debate over
corporate criminal liability took shape in the late 1800s, principals
and agents had conceived of ways to reduce their exposure to losses
from the risks of a vicarious liability.
E. The Contemporaneous Rise of Intracorporate Liability
and Loss Shifting
By the time the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hudson, a
well-articulated body of statutory and decisional law had developed on
shifting risks of liability and loss between a corporation, its directors,
and officers. While Hudson supported state and federal prosecutions
of corporations, firms responded by purchasing fidelity bonds and
insurance for lines arising from the crimes of their employees, as well
as indemnifying corporate directors and officers from derivative
actions by shareholders. These and other intracorporate loss shifting
mechanisms emerged for reasons that are indistinguishable from
those that prompted corporate criminal liability in the first place.
Shareholders, top management, middle management, and sub-
ordinate employees sought ways to accommodate the conflicting
incentives that emerged with the separation of ownership and
control.138
placed officers who can stay at a safe distance from criminal acts performed
lower in the corporate hierarchy.
Fisse, supra note 76, at 70.
137. See Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 1254-55.
138. It is difficult to imagine how the emergence of principles of corporate criminal law,
particularly the effect of the MPC on state law doctrine, can be interpreted without reference to
intracorporate loss shifting. See generally Frederick Dwight, Liability of Corporate Directors, 17
YALE L.J. 33 (1907) (bemoaning the inadequate performance of directors in modern
corporations); M.C. Lynch, Diligence of Directors in the Management of Corporations, 3 CAL. L.
REV. 21, 21 (1914) ('Modern business conditions during the years since 1896 have brought the
question of the responsibility of directors for abuses of their powers, violations of their duties,
and their liability for their conduct and acts either of omission or commission squarely before
the public for serious attention.'); C. Brewster Rhoads, Personal Liability of Directors for
Corporate Mismanagement, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 128 (1916) (focusing on the leading American case
for the mismanagement of directors, Spering's Appeal). This is not to suggest that
indemnification emerged for reasons other than corporate self-interest. See generally Joseph P.
Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers Indemnification and Liability
Insurance: An Overview of Legal and Practical Issues, 51 BUS. LAW. 573 (1996) (discussing the
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1. Director and Officer Losses
In the 1800s, directors and officers were regarded as both
trustee and agent.139 Defining the boundaries of their fiduciary
responsibility and civil liability, however, challenged the wisdom of
the bench.140 In Spering's Appeal, for example, Justice Sharswood of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that directors are personally
liable to shareholders "for any losses resulting from fraud, embezzle-
ment or willful misconduct or breach of trust for their own benefit and
not for the benefit of stockholders, for gross inattention and
negligence by which such fraud or misconduct has been perpetrated
by agents, officers or co-directors .... 141 Directors are free from
liability, Sharswood concluded, where they have made honest
mistakes of judgment within the bounds of their powers and
discretion. 4 2
In 1891, the United States Supreme Court considered director
liability for the first time in Briggs v. Spaulding, holding that
directors must be vigilant in their supervision, and exercise ordinary
skill and diligence in the administration of their business affairs. 143
Further, the Court reasoned that directors are not absolved "from the
duty of reasonable supervision, nor ought they to be permitted to be
shielded from liability because of want of knowledge of wrong-doing, if
that ignorance is the result of gross inattention."'144
Not that long after the recognition of director liability both in
state and federal courts, directors sought indemnification for the costs
rise of director and officer indemnification as "a key ingredient to effective corporate
management).
139. See, e.g., H.A. Cushing, The Liability of the Inactive Corporate Director, 8 COLUM. L.
REV. 18 (1908).
140. See Lynch, supra note 138, at 22; see also Robert J. Keller, Degree of Diligence a
Director Must Exercise to Avoid Liability to the Corporation, 7 MARQ. L. REV. 159 (1923); cf.
Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891):
[Directors] are not insurers of the fidelity of the agents whom they have
appointed, who are not their agents but the agents of the corporation; and
they cannot be held responsible for losses resulting from the wrongful acts or
omissions of other directors or agents, unless the loss is a consequence of
their own neglect of duty, either for failure to supervise the business with
attention or in neglecting to use proper care in the appointment of agents.
Unfortunately, Briggs has not survived. See generally. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997)
(overturning Briggs by holding that there is no federal common law standard of care for officers
and directors, but finding a gross negligence standard for directors or officers of federally
insured savings institutions).
141. Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 24 (1872).
142. See id.
143. Briggs, 141 U.S. at 165.
144. Id. at 165-66.
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of defending against shareholder suits in federal securities cases. 145
Indemnification was justified given the inadequacy of compensation
relative to liability risks. Further, indemnification was intended to
free otherwise risk averse directors to engage in desirable risk
bearing activities. 14 6 In 1941, the first state statute authorizing
indemnification of directors and officers appeared in New York. 47
Most states followed New York after provisions on indemnification
appeared in the Model Business Corporation Act. 48 In recent years,
indemnification statutes have been amended to permit corporations to
purchase director and officer liability insurance. 149 Such policies, first
introduced with the passage of federal securities laws, include
provisions for corporate reimbursement for indemnification payments
made to directors and officers, as well as those that provide personal
coverage for directors and officers for unindemnified payments. 50
Concerns with loss shifting appear reasonable given the
changes to liability rules following the MPC, and the rise of
indemnification and insurance.' 5 ' Such concerns were that much
more reasonable when indemnification was extended to shareholder
145. See, e.g., Solimine v. Hollander, 19 A.2d 344 (N.J. Ch. 1941) (holding that directors
and officers have a right to recover costs in successfully defending against a derivative action
alleging double-dealing, negligence, fraud, diversion of funds, and mismanagement); Jesse v.
Four-Wheel Drive Auto Co., 189 N.W. 276 (Wis. 1922) (refusing to allow directors to use
corporate funds to pay for their defense against personal charges); Figge v. Bergenthal, 109
N.W. 581 (Wis. 1906) (requiring the corporation to pay the attorneys fees for directors that were
found innocent of fraud and mismanagement); George E. Bates & Eugene M. Zuckert, Directors'
Indemnity: Corporate Policy or Public Policy, 20 HARV. BUS. REV. 244 (1942); Joseph W. Bishop,
Jr. Current Status of Corporate Directors' Right to Indemnification, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1057
(1956); Ralph M. Carson, Further Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 29 CORNELL L.
Q. 431 (1944); Distribution of Risk Imposed Upon Corporate Officials By Federal Securities
Legislation, 49 YALE L.J. 1423 (1940); George D. Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's
Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1939); Orrin L. Helstad & Russell F. Williams, Note,
Corporations-Directors' Reimbursement for Litigation Expenses, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 157; Note,
Defence of Directors by Corporation Against Suit Brought in Its Behalf, 43 YALE L.J. 661 (1934);
Harris W. Seed, Comment, Corporate Responsibility for Litigation Expenses of Management, 40
CAL. L. REV. 104 (1952); Recent Case, Corporations-Officers-Right of Directors to Use Corporate
Funds to Defend Suit Against Them As Individuals, 16 MINN. L. REV. 102 (1931).
146. See Alfred F. Conrad, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability For Negligence,
1972 DUKE LJ. 895, 898-900.
147. See Indemnification of Directors and Officers-An Annotation to the Model Business
Corporation Act, 13 BUS. LAW. 693 (1958); see also Joseph W. Bishop, Indemnification of
Corporate Directors, Officers and Employees, 20 Bus. LAW. 833 (1965).
148. See Indemnification of Directors and Officers, supra note 147, at 694.
149. See Liability Insurance for Corporate Executives, 80 HARV. L. REV. 648 (1967)
(questioning the public policy of director and officer insurance).
150. See Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors' and Officers' Liability
Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1989) (describing the problems with the directors and officers'
insurance market in the 1980s).
151. See generally Joseph F. Johnston, Jr., Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insur-
ance for Directors and Officers, 33 BUS. LAw. 1993 (1978); Note, supra note 97.
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claims for compensation from directors' involvement in criminal
activities.
For example, in Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, the Tenth Circuit
recognized a cause of action by a corporation to recover losses
attributed to the criminal and civil antitrust violations of its
employees. 152 The implicit objective of the corporate plaintiff was to
"shift the losses that attend corporate criminality to fiduciaries whose
actions on behalf of the corporation constituted, caused, or
contributed to the criminal activity for which the corporation has been
punished."'153 In finding for Wilshire, the court reasoned that the
burden of the loss should fall upon the agent who committed the
crime (or tolerated the commission of a crime), not to an innocent
principal.5 4 Employees owe a distinct duty to a corporation that, if
breached, gives the latter a clear right to recover for any losses
resulting from the breach. 55 The cause of action is analogous to a
derivative suit by shareholders. 56
2. Employee Losses
Of course, long before Wilshire was decided, corporations were
actively recovering losses due to the criminal acts of employees from
third party insurers. From the time of Hudson, the incompatibility of
intracorporate loss shifting and the doctrine of respondeat superior
was most apparent with the purchase of fidelity bonds and fidelity
insurance coverage. 57 Fidelity bonds and insurance policies compen-
152. Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969). Wilshire follows in a tradition
of corporate indemnification for civil actions of gross negligence, fraud, and mismanagement.
See, e.g., Trustees of the Mut. Bldg. Fund & Dollar Sav. Bank v. Bosseiux, 3 F. 817 (E.D. Va.
1880) (holding that directors are liable separately and jointly for the losses to the company
resulting from fraud and negligence); Broderick v. Marcus, 272 N.Y.S. 455 (Sup. Ct. 1934)
(accepting a cause of action against the former directors of the Bank of United States to recover
losses sustained by the bank as a result of their breaches); Anthony v. Jeffress, 90 S.E. 414
(N.C. 1916) (finding that the Central Mercantile Company may recover damages from directors
for their negligence in the management of the affairs of the corporation).
153. Werder, supra note 54, at 37.
154. See Wilshire, 409 F.2d at 1283.
155. See id. at 1284 (The corporation is "merely attempting to redress an injury which was
inflicted as a result of an effort on the part of certain of its employees to commit a public
wrong.').
156. See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 182 A.2d 328 (Del. Ch. 1962), affd, 188
A.2d 125 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963); Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct.
1942) affd mem., 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (App. Div. 1944).
157. See First Nat'l Bank v. National Sur. Co., 130 F. 401 (6th Cir. 1904); Florida Cent. &
R.R. Co. v. American Sur. Co., 99 F. 674 (2d Cir. 1900); Supreme Council Catholic Knights of
America v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 63 F. 48 (6th Cir. 1894); Lombard Inv. Co. v. American Sur. Co.,
65 F. 476 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1895); Mayor of Brunswick v. Harvey, 40 S.E. 754 (Ga. 1902); John
Church Co. v. Aetna Indem. Co., 80 S.E. 1093 (Ga. Ct. App. 1913); Grant County Bldg., Loan &
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sate firms for losses attributable to a wide range of employee
infidelities committed within the course of employment, from crimes
to breaches of trust and dishonesty. 58  Commercial coverage for
employee infidelity predates Hudson in separate policies, as part of
larger insurance policies, and in the 1920s with blanket indemnity
bonds. 5 9  Significant litigation challenging provisions of fidelity
instruments and their interpretation, may be seen as early as the
middle 1800s. 160
Fidelity claims undercut the incentives and disincentives of an
imputed fault. As corporations were subjected to vicarious liability for
the malfeasance or nonfeasance of their agents immediately after
Hudson, they were at liberty to purchase a hedge against the costs of
sanctions. 161 Banks recovered losses due to the fraudulent actions of
employees, ranging from the president, secretary, and treasurer, to
cashiers; 162 real estate companies were reimbursed for the embezzle-
ment of rent collectors; 163 an agricultural company recovered losses
from employee embezzlement; 64 a grain company recouped losses
from fraudulent misrepresentations of a warehouse superintendent;6 5
Sav. Ass'n v. Lemmon, 78 S.W. 874 (Ky. 1904); American Bonding & Trust Co. v. Milwaukee
Harvester Co., 48 A. 72 (Md. 1900); Lexington & W. Cambridge R.R. Co. v. Elwell, 90 Mass. (8
Allen) 371 (1864); First Natl Bank v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 75 S.W. 1076 (Tenn.
1903).
158. For a consideration of fidelity bonds in relation to the proposed Restatement (Third) of
Suretyship, see generally Hugh E. Reynolds, Jr. & James Dimos, Fidelity Bonds and the
Restatement, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1249 (1993).
159. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Barber, 70 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1934)
(discussing a fidelity schedule bond issued to a bank). In addition to commercial fidelity
coverage and fidelity bonds, governments may purchase public official bonds, and banks may
purchase financial institution bonds.
160. See, e.g., Note, Fidelity Bonds-Does It Pay to Renew Them? 27 MICH. L. REV. 442
(1929); Francis T. Goheen, Recent Decisions, Principal and Surety-Fidelity Bonds-Effect of
Failure to Make Disclosures Regarding Bonded Employees, 35 MICH. L. REV. 345 (1936); Recent
Decisions, Insurance-Corporations-Illegal Act of Directors As Constituting Act of the
Corporation-Liability of Insurer on Fidelity Policy, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 365 (1933). For a
discussion of the concerns with firm liability policies, see generally Charles F. Krone,
Employers' Liability Policies, 44 AM. L. REV. 513 (1910). The rise of insurance law is considered
by W.R. Vance, The Early History of Insurance Law, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1908).
161. See Recent Case, Corporations-Liability of Employees-Corporations May Seek
Indemnity for Civil or Criminal Liability Incurred By Employee's Violation of Antitrust Law
Without Corporation's Knowledge or Consent-Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir.
1969), 83 HARV. L. REV. 943 (1970).
162. See Centerville State Bank v. National Sur. Co., 27 F.2d 552 (D. Kan. 1928)
(president); Forest City Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Davis, 133 S.E. 530 (N.C. 1926) (secretary-
treasurer); Morrellville Deposit Bank v. Royal Indem. Co., 144 A. 424 (Pa. 1928) (cashier).
163. See Curran & Treadaway, Inc. v. American Bonding Co., 192 So. 335 (La. 1939).
164. See American Bonding & Trust Co. v. Milwaukee Harvester Co., 48 A. 72 (Md. 1900).
165. See Kendrick-Roan Grain & Elevator Co. v. Weaver, 163 S.W. 814 (Tenn. 1913).
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and. a finance conpany recovered misappropriated funds from its
fidelity insurer for acts of an employee who committed fraud.
166
3. Loss Shifting and the New Gospel
The recovery of losses caused by employee deviance through
fidelity instruments and the indemnification of directors and officers
accused of fraud and mismanagement serve as a disincentive for
owners-particularly those in small firms-to encourage or promote
the active monitoring of employees by management. 167 With some
recent loss shifting decisions, moreover, it is simply unclear whether
the risk sharing incentives of vicarious liability still have meaning.
In In re Caremark International, Inc., shareholders sought
recovery from directors for fines paid following the criminal conviction
of their company for employee violations of laws regulating health
care providers. 168  Caremark pleaded guilty to mail fraud, and paid
significant civil and criminal fines. 69 In a creative marriage of the
business judgment rule, the American Law Institute's Principles of
Corporate Governance, and the Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations, the fiduciary duties of corporate directors were
extended to matters of organizational compliance.
170
The Delaware Chancery Court ruled that the duty of a director
includes the assurance of compliance procedures and reporting
166. See White & Bollard, Inc. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 27 P.2d 123 (Wash. 1933).
167. See Recent Case, supra note 161, at 945. In this note, the author argues that allowing
indemnity will deter employees, but denying indemnity will encourage shareholders to increase
surveillance and monitoring of employees, no matter how distant they are from the day-to-day
operations of the firm. Denying indemnity also will assist prosecutors in gaining access to
internal corporate information necessary for prosecuting antitrust violations. See id.
168. In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
169. See Richard S. Gruner, Director and Officer Liability for Defective Compliance
Systems: Caremark and Beyond, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AFTER CAREMARK, supra note 3, at
57.
170. See Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, the Business Judgment Rule, and the American
Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 BUS. LAW. 1355 (1993); Joseph F. Savage, Jr.,
Caremark: Director's Fiduciary Duty in a Sentencing Guidelines World, BUS. CRIMES BULL.,
Jan. 1997, at 4. For an interesting pre-Caremark discussion of director liability, see generally
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237
(1997); James L. Griffith, Jr., Director Oversight Liability: Twenty-First Century Standards and
Legislative Controls on Liability, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 653 (1995). "One aspect of the board's
general duty of care obligation in the oversight and inquiry areas is an affirmative obligation of
directors to be reasonably concerned with the existence and effectiveness of procedures,
programs, and other techniques... to assist the board in overseeing the corporation's business."
ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01
comment to § 4.01(a)(1)-(a)(2), cmt. c (1994)
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systems reasonably capable of preventing law violations. 171
Accordingly, a "failure to do so under some circumstances may, in
theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-
compliance with applicable legal standards."1 72 In the aftermath of
the decision, corporate counsel preached the new "post-Caremark"
gospel by admonishing boards to assume a proactive role in allocating
sufficient resources to ensure the active monitoring of agents
throughout the corporate hierarchy. 73
The wisdom of this gospel was tested in a recent settlement of
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") charges against senior
officers and directors of W.R. Grace & Co. for their failure to make
required disclosures to shareholders. 74 Following an investigation by
the staff of the Division of Enforcement in 1996, the SEC charged the
chairman of the board, the chief executive officer, as well as various
directors and officers with a failure to disclose details of a retirement
package, as well as certain negotiations to sell a subsidiary to the ex-
chairman's son.175 The SEC concluded that the absence of disclosures
violated securities laws, and the likely culprit was top management's
acceptance of the corporate culture at W.R. Grace. 76 Although SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt has urged corporate counsel not to interpret
W. R. Grace as an extension of a board's responsibility, commentators
have seen the investigation and subsequent SEC ruling as a
complement to the decision in Caremark.77 Together, these cases
suggest that the duty of corporate directors to protect shareholder
interests includes an obligation to use compliance systems to monitor
both management and subordinate employees.
171. Notably, the Caremark decision fails to specify the boundaries of a director's duties,
the meaning of "good faith" efforts by directors, and the extent of a director's duty to supervise
and monitor compliance efforts. See Caremark, 698 A.2d 959.
172. Id. at 970.
173. According to Harvey Pitt and his colleagues, directors must ensure that managers
demonstrate a respect and allegiance to the law, update codes, ensure that the corporation
provides sufficient compliance-related training and education, provide an anonymous means of
communicating unethical or illegal acts when observed by employees, maintain an awareness of
relevant legal issues, and reasonably delegate the supervisory oversight of corporate internal
controls. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., Director Duties to Uncover and Respond to Management
Misconduct, INSIGHTS, June 1997, at 5, 8.
174. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Concerning the Conduct of Certain Former Officers and Directors of W.R. Grace & Co., 65
SEC DOCKET 1240 (1997).
175. See id.
176. See id. at 1243-44.
177. See SEC 'Should Be More Outspoken' On Directors' Duty to Monitor Management, 30
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 398 (Mar. 13, 1998); see also Susan Kavanaugh, Corporations Discuss
Ethics Challenges and Opportunities, FED. ETHICS REP., June 1998, at 1.
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HI. THE GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION AND CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
Though we cannot doubt the impact of a due diligence defense
that insulates the corporate entity, the passage of MPC provisions
that shift liability downward, the many ex ante and ex post
mechanisms that serve the function of intracorporate loss shifting,
and a new vision of the board's duty of care, each of these pales in
comparison to the Guidelines' effect on the risk equilibrium of
principals and their agents. This causes no surprise. Following
passage of the Guidelines, maximum corporate sentences in federal
courts were increased significantly while the range of permissible
judicial departures was narrowed. 178 Yet both surprising and counter-
intuitive is the effect that the Guidelines have had on the actual risk
of liability in firms.
A. Risk Shifting and the Emergence of the
Good Citizen Corporation
The Guidelines reflect a "carrot and stick" approach. They
acknowledge that management can engage in a proactive compliance
that will reduce the likelihood of criminal activity, that Guidelines
tied to "good citizen" actions will create incentives for law abidance,
and that the failure to engage in such actions will result in significant
fines. These objectives are explained in provisions that allow for
sentence mitigation and aggravation. The commentary accompanying
these provisions reveals prescriptive steps for due diligence that, in
combination, afford firms insulation against criminal investigation,
indictment, conviction, and significant fines. 179  The Guidelines'
178. See Laufer, supra note 76, at 1082-84.
179. According to the Guidelines, "culpability generally will be determined by the steps
taken by the organization prior to the offense to prevent and detect criminal conduct, the level
and extent of involvement in or tolerance of the offense by certain personnel, and the
organization's actions after an offense has been committed." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 43, at introductory commentary to ch. 8. Thus, while the Commissioners
acknowledged that organizations act through agents, they also adopted the view that
organizations operate, act, and have culpability. Consider, for example, the Commission's
conceptualization of due diligence. Under the Guidelines, an effective program that prevents
and detects crimes is underwritten by an organization's due diligence. Six of the seven factors
considered by courts as evidence of organizational due diligence explicitly acknowledge the
actions of the corporate entity:
(1) The organization must have established compliance standards and procedures to be
followed by its employees and other agents that are reasonably capable of reducing the
prospect of criminal conduct. (2) Specific individual(s) within high-level personnel of the
organization must have been assigned overall responsibility to oversee compliance with
such standards and procedures. (3) The organization must have used due care not to
delegate substantial discretionary authority to individuals whom the organization knew,
1382 [Vol. 52:1343
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mitigation provisions dramatically changed organizational strategy.
Corporations no longer needed to plead with courts to recognize their
diligent efforts. With the strong downward shift of liability, the
importance to firms of the many loss shifting mechanisms had
diminished. Indeed, the fate of vicarious liability was all but sealed.
The liability rule that had been attacked and undermined since its
recognition in Hudson would now be ignored by prosecutors wielding
unbridled discretion to investigate, indict, settle, or proceed to trial.
1. A New Phase of Corporate Law Enforcement
Within the past decade, organizations have seized upon these
prescriptive steps in the Guidelines' commentary, marking a new
phase of corporate criminal law enforcement.180 In this phase of "post-
Guidelines" cases, corporate compliance for large, decentralized
multinationals is bought and sold as cost-effective risk management
in a marketplace of experts from "business integrity" consulting,
insurance, and accounting firms.' 8 ' Evidence of organizational due
diligence may forestall an investigation, minimize the chance of a
criminal indictment, and possibly lead to a grant of governmental
amnesty.18 2  In fact, in many jurisdictions, prosecutors are likely to
or should have known through the exercise of due diligence, had a propensity to engage
in illegal activities. (4) The organization must have taken steps to communicate
effectively its standards and procedures to all employees and other agents, e.g., by
requiring participation in training programs or by disseminating publications that
explain in a practical manner what is required. (5) The organization must have taken
reasonable steps to achieve compliance with its standards, e.g., by utilizing monitoring
and auditing systems reasonably designed to detect criminal conduct by its employees
and other agents and by having in place and publicizing a reporting system whereby
employees and other agents could report criminal conduct by others within the
organization without fear of retribution. (6) The standards must have been consistently
enforced through appropriate disciplinary mechanisms, including, as appropriate,
discipline of individuals responsible for the failure to detect an offense. Adequate
discipline of individuals responsible for an offense is a necessary component of
enforcement; however, the form of discipline that will be appropriate will be case
specific. (7) After an offense has been detected, the organization must have taken all
reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the offense and to prevent further similar
offenses-including any necessary modifications to its program to prevent and detect
violations of law.
Id. at § 8A1.2(3)(k)(1)-(7) commentary at 389-90.
180. See generally Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil
and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559 (1990).
For a reasonable view of Chapter Eight prescriptions, see Jeffrey M. Kaplan & George F.
Meierhofer, Jr., Compliance Programs on Trial, PREVENTIVE L. REP., Spring 1997, at 27
(discussing compliance initiatives in the securities industry).
181. See, e.g., John H. Baker, Who Wants to Buy Preventive Law?, PREVENTIVE L. REP., Fall
1995, at 21 (noting how compliance may be marketed as a product).
182. As Neil Cartusciello has noted:
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decline cases involving organizations with compliance programs
modeled after the Guidelines' prescriptive steps. This is especially
true in complex white-collar and corporate crime cases (e.g., antitrust
and securities fraud), which require significant investigative and
prosecutorial resources. 183  Declinations reward firms for their
proactive and reactive efforts, focus scarce resources on the most
abusive firms, and identify organizations that will not benefit from
the Guidelines' mitigation credit. 8 4
The effect of the Guidelines on the balance of risks between
agents and principals is predictable. Culpability scores, as well as
judgments, as to the effectiveness of compliance efforts turn on the
role of high-level personnel and those with substantial organizational
authority 8 5 Corporations face increasing fines where high-level
[A] corporation that fully cooperates and provides the government with
information, access to witnesses and perhaps even access to otherwise
privileged information, has a far better chance of avoiding indictment than
one that does not. So, too, the corporation that disciplines or even
terminates the wrongdoer employees, and installs management systems
designed to detect and prevent such violations from recurring before charges
are filed, can avoid an indictment.
Cartusciello, supra note 126, at 3.
183. See John Hagan et al., The Social Organization of White-Collar Sanctions: A Study of
Prosecution and Punishment in the Federal Courts, in WHITE-COLLAR AND ECONOMIC CRIME 259
(Peter Wickman & Timothy Dailey eds., 1982); Susan P. Shapiro, The Road Not Taken: The
Elusive Path to Criminal Prosecution for White-Collar Offenders, 19 LAW & SOC'Y. REV. 179
(1985).
184. See Richard S. Gruner, Reducing Corporate Criminal Liability Through Post-Offense
Responses, in ALI-ABA, supra note 5, at 161, 168; Laufer, Integrity, supra note 7, at 164-65. As
one prosecutor observed: "In general, if a company promptly discloses wrongdoing, makes full
restitution to the government, and takes swift disciplinary action against the employees
engaged in the misconduct, a prosecutor may conclude that the federal interest in prosecuting
the corporation under these circumstances is significantly lessened." Robert S. Litt, The
Experience and Views of the Enforcement Community, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 303,
306.
185. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 43, at ch. 8:
'High-level personnel of the organization' means individuals who have
substantial control over the organization or who have a substantial role in
the making of policy within the organization. The term includes: a director;
an executive officer; an individual in charge of a major business or functional
unit of the organization, such as sales, administration, or finance; and an
individual with a substantial ownership interest.
Id. at § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(b). "'Substantial authority personnel' means individuals who, within the
scope of their authority, exercise a substantial measure of discretion in acting on behalf of an
organization. The term includes high-level personnel, individuals who exercise substantial
supervisory authority (e.g., a plant manager, a sales manager), and any other individuals who,
although not a part of an organization's management, nevertheless exercise substantial
discretion when acting within the scope of their authority (e.g., an individual with authority in
an organization to negotiate or set price levels or an individual authorized to negotiate or
approve significant contracts.)." Id. at § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(c).
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personnel participate in, condone, or deliberately ignore illegal acts. 186
Higher culpability scores are assessed on organizations when
personnel of substantial authority tolerate pervasive violations. 8 7
Where employees with substantial authority participate in an offense,
the Guidelines mandate a rebuttable presumption that extant
compliance programs are ineffective. 8 8
The substantial connection between top management's
involvement in the commission of an offense and the Guidelines'
determination of corporate culpability provides a powerful incentive
for organizations to push liability risk down the hierarchy, and away
from the firm.189  Corporate counsel are the first to say that their
objective is to recast violations by employees across the organization
as those that were committed by wayward employees-agents who
failed to comply with a prescribed set of reactive and proactive
corporate principles. 190
Corporate legal departments are in the unenviable position of
assisting prosecutors in developing criminal cases against wayward
employees, a phenomenon known as "flipping," in an attempt to
minimize the allocation of liability to the entity.91 Many corporate
186. See id. at § 8C2.5(b).
187. See id.
188. See id. at § 8C2.5(f).
189. For a discussion as to how firms respond to this incentive, see infra Part Ill.B.
190. Data on the number of defendants prosecuted in federal courts for white-collar crimes
following the Guidelines support this trend. The figure below illustrates the number of
prosecutions in U.S. district courts between 1988 and 1993, for embezzlement, fraud (excluding
tax), forgery, and counterfeiting.
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BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING,
1982-1993, WITH PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 1994 2 (1996).
191. In discussing corporate compliance failures, Joseph E. Murphy noted that one of the
central goals of compliance is to deter prosecution. "If you want any credit," according to
Murphy, "your company must roll over and flip the culprits to the prosecutors." Joseph E.
Murphy, Handling the Risks: How to Respond to Compliance Failures, in ALI-ABA, supra note
3, at 281, 299; see also John F. Savarese & Carol Miller, Employee Issues in Internal
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policies now require an affirmative disclosure of criminal violations by
employees directly to regulators and prosecutors. 19 2 In the absence of
such policies, there is still a strong incentive to flip given the
negotiating leverage gained by defendants in pleading guilty,
especially in complex corporate crime cases.193 Where the entity is
threatened with indictment, and evidence of individual misconduct is
not disclosed, prosecutors need only resort to the threat of parallel
civil proceedings to force the corporate hand. 94
2. Corporate and Prosecutorial Behavior Under the Guidelines
The Guidelines may be credited for the renewed interest of the
business community in ethics and legal compliance. Further, the
work of the Commission has brought concerns with corporate
responsibility and organizational deviance to the forefront of a
Investigations, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AFTER CAREMARK, supra note 3, at 1043; Gregory J.
Wallance & Jay W. Waks, Internal Investigation of Suspected Wrongdoing by Corporate
Employees, 11 CORP. COUNSEL'S Q. 77 (1995); Dean Starkman, Pollution Case Highlights Trend
to Let Employees Take the Rap, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1997, at B10 ("What happened in the
IDarling Internationalj case is being repeated across the country. Corporations under
government investigation are increasingly turning on their employees to win leniency for
themselves.'). For a discussion of this practice in terms of leverage, see BRENT FISSE & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY 159 (1993) ('Using collective liability
as a lever for bringing internal accountability out in the open.. 2).
192. See Kirk S. Jordan & Joseph E. Murphy, Compliance Programs: What the Government
Really Wants, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: HOW TO BE A GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION THROUGH
SELF-POLICING, supra note 3, at 121, 127. Commission data of corporations convicted over the
past three years reveal an absence of organizations that self-report violations. In 1994, 1.8% of
all corporations sentenced self-reported; 3.7% in 1995; and 0.0% in 1996. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 130 (1995); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 127
(1996); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 38 (1997). Prosecutors openly discuss
the role of self-reporting. See Litt, supra note 184, at 306 ('In general, if a company promptly
discloses wrongdoing, makes full restitution to the government, and takes swift disciplinary
action against the employees engaged in the misconduct, a prosecutor may conclude that the
federal interest in prosecuting the corporation under these circumstances is significantly
lessened.').
193. See Celesta A. Albonetti, Direct and Indirect Effects of Case Complexity, Guilty Pleas,
and Offender Characteristics on Sentencing for Offenders Convicted of a White-Collar Offense
Prior to Sentencing Guidelines, 14 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 353 (1998) (discussing the
incentives associated with guilty pleas and the shifting negotiating power of defendants in
complex white-collar crime cases). See generally KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985).
194. For a recent examination of prosecutorial strategy in relation to civil versus criminal
proceedings, see Khanna, supra note 78, at 1525 (arguing that the pursuit of parallel
proceedings by prosecutors place organizations in a poor strategic position, because it forces the
disclosure of their litigation strategies, while encouraging the loss of civil claims so as to
encourage prosecutorial leniency). See generally Coffee, supra note 35; John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done
About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875 (1992); Modern Pressures, supra note 21; Savage & Martz, supra
note 20.
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critically important debate over corporate compliance. The effect of
the Guidelines on corporate and prosecutorial behavior, however,
raises serious concerns about the real meaning of good corporate
citizenship, and the apparent weakness of corporate self-regulation. 195
Most of these concerns reflect the insignificance of vicarious liability
in the enforcement of corporate crime. 196
In contrast to the moderate but steady rise in individual
liability over the past decade, there are simply fewer post-Guidelines
corporate cases that proceed beyond a plea agreement or civil
settlement. There are so few cases that the idea of "going to trial" is
now discussed as if it is a thing of the past.197 Deferred prosecution
and pretrial diversion have emerged as the preferred tools of
prosecutors. 198 Even though the Commission recently reported that
220 corporations were sentenced in federal courts under Chapter
Eight of the Guidelines in 1997, a forty percent increase over the prior
year and nearly twice as many as in 1994, this still represents
significantly fewer annual convictions than in most years before the
Guidelines were passed.199
195. The idea of a good citizen corporation was discussed at some length nearly thirty years
ago in Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U. L. REV. 157,
163-64 (1970). Good corporate citizenship is different from organizational citizenship behavior.
See generally Linn Van Dyne et al., Organizational Citizenship Behavior: Construct
Redefinition, Measurement, and Validation, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 765 (1994).
196. See Savage & Martz, supra note 20, at 13.
197. See Is the Corporate Defense a Relic of the Past or a Glimmer of the Future?,
Prevention of Corp. Liab. (BNA) 12 (July 20, 1998) (recognizing the antiquated federal law "on
corporate criminal liability," and the paucity of corporations going to trial).
198. See generally Warin & Schwartz, supra note 129 (discussing the externalities
associated with the prosecution of large, publicly traded entities).
199. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 40 (1998). The Commission
is required by statute to collect information concerning all organizational defendants that are
sentenced in federal courts across all districts. Unfortunately, data collection efforts have been
less than optimal. Commission data are compromised by the fact that: (a) not all cases have
been reported to the Commission by the United States Probation Office, resulting in
Commission efforts to supplement data files with cases gleaned from media reports; (b) only
those federal criminal cases that terminate at the sentencing phase are reported, neglecting an
ever increasing trend toward plea agreements and prosecutorial preference for civil proceedings;
and (c) data sets for the first two years following the passage of the Guidelines are incomplete
and, thus, too unreliable for any meaningful analysis. Even with these limitations, the data do
not clearly demonstrate the number of convictions seen in pre-Guidelines prosecution or an
overall significant increase in fines. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 45-47
(1994); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 29-31 (1995); U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 33-35 (1996); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT
31-32 (1997); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 33-34 (1998). For an excellent
discussion of the increase in fines during 1984-87 and 1989-90, see generally Mark A. Cohen,
Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Study of Social Harm and Sentencing Practice in the
Federal Courts, 1984-1987, 26 AM. CRIM. L. Rev. 605 (1989); Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime
and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 247 (1991).
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Why should the relative decline in convictions with a
corresponding increase in pretrial diversion raise concerns? First, the
trend suggests a discretionary use of the corporate criminal law by
prosecutors that circumvents the overriding justification for
sentencing guidelines-reducing discretion and the risk of
disparity. 200 Second, given the absence of "effective" compliance
initiatives in many of the corporations that were spared continued
prosecution, one must question the allegiance of prosecutors to the
widely touted "carrot and stick" philosophy of the Guidelines. Third,
any comparison of the kinds of cases that move forward to trial and
conviction, against those that are diverted, reveals a difference in size
and ownership structure.
The trend toward convictions of small, privately held
organizations continues to be strong. Over the past five years, an
average of ninety-six percent of all organizations sentenced in federal
courts have been privately held, with fewer than fifty employees.20' In
addition, there remains a significant awareness of and involvement in
the illegalities by senior management of these small firms. In a
majority of cases, owners and top management are prosecuted as
individuals and convicted along with the corporation. 20 2
200. See William W. Wildns, Jr. & John R. Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline
Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63, 64
(1993) ("Congress was motivated by several primary objectives in enacting sentencing reform
legislation, but none was more important than increasing fairness and uniformity in
sentencing.').
201. See William S. Laufer, A Study of Small Business Compliance Practices, in
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 135; John Scalia, Jr., Cases Sentenced Under the Guidelines, in
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 243, 244 ("Consistent with what Bill Laufer found in his study,
the organizations sentenced under the guidelines typically employ fewer than 50
people.... [T]he overwhelming majority, 56%, employed fewer than 20 persons, and another 23
percent employed between 20 and 100 people. A very small percentage employed fewer [sic]
than 500. Under the Small Business Administration criteria, those organizations employing
fewer than 50 people would be classified as extremely small organizations.'); Joe Davidson,
Corporate Sentencing Guidelines Have Snagged Mostly Small Firms, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1995,
at B3; Laufer & Darnell, supra note 1. See also Macey, supra note 60, at 323. Only 2.9% of the
organizations sentenced in the calendar year 1997 employed more than 1,000 individuals; 33.6%
employed less than 10 individuals; and 42.1% employed between 10 and 100 individuals. Of the
220 organizations convicted in federal courts, only four were publicly traded companies. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 40 (1998).
202. According to Scalia in his piece Cases Sentenced Under the Guidelines, PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 1, at 243, 244, more than 96% of the post-Guidelines cases, as of 1995, involved
closely held organizations. This, in part, accounts for the fact that owners or top management
are aware of illegalities and are often named as co-defendants with the organization. In 1995,
Scalia observed that: "Of the 264 closely held organizations sentenced thus far, an owner or top
executive was convicted in approximately 51 percent, or 134, of these cases; 189 owners or top
executives were convicted in all." Id. Most recent data support Scalia's observation: 344
individuals were convicted in individual prosecutions for the same offense conduct that led to
162 corporate convictions; 104 were owners, and 39 were officers. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 41 (1998).
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Cases reported to the Commission following the passage of the
Guidelines also point to the power of compliance programs-no
matter how effective or ineffective-as preventive law.203 Only one of
the corporations convicted in federal courts in 1997 had what was
determined by a court to be an "effective" compliance program. 20 4
Annual Commission data also reveal that mitigation credit for having
a compliance program-effective or not-is rarely offered to the few
corporations that go to trial and are convicted. 20 5
The absence of effective compliance programs and the failure
of corporations to obtain even nontrivial mitigation credit may be
interpreted in several ways. First, reasonably constructed compliance
initiatives effectively shift prosecutorial attention to alternate civil
remedies, consent decrees, and plea agreements, as well as the
criminal investigation of individual agents.20 6 A more interesting and
important question, however, is whether ineffective compliance
initiatives also inhibit the criminal process. As the Deputy Assistant
Attorney General in the Criminal Division of the Department of
Justice observed, prosecutors often require corporations to
contractually promise to establish a compliance program or
strengthen an existing ineffective initiative as part of an agreement
203. See, e.g., Michael M. Baylson, Getting the Demons Into Heaven: A Good Corporate
Compliance Program, 2 CORP. CONDUCT Q. 33, 34 (1992):
But with a compliance program, you might be able to show that high
corporate officials were not aware of it or did not in any way encourage it;
you might be able to show that individuals did not believe they were
committing a crime and as soon as criminal liability was suggested, they
stopped whatever they were doing.
204. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 41 (1998). Federal courts are
consistent in ruling that organizations fail to satisfy all of the requirements of § 8A1.2 (1997).
In both 1994 and 1995, three companies offered evidence of compliance procedures, albeit
inadequate, according to reviewing courts. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1994 ANNUAL
REPORT 125 (1995); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 124-25 (1996).
205. See Scalia Cases Sentenced Under the Guidelines, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at
243, 245.
206. See Baylson, supra note 203, at 33-35 ('You must recognize the role of prosecutorial
discretion in the bringing of charges. This is the other fundamental reason why a compliance
program is essential.... Having an effective compliance program to pull out of your portfolio
and lay on the prosecutor's desk is a very key weapon .... You cannot get to first base with a
prosecutor without having a compliance program, and having one may land you a home run.');
cf. MICHAEL L. BENSON & FRANCIS T. CULLEN, COMBATING CORPORATE CRIME: LOCAL
PROSECUTORS AT WORK (1998). Unfortunately, Benson and Cullen's survey of district attorneys
and state prosecutors fails to inquire about the role of corporate compliance initiatives, even
though anecdotal evidence of a comparable effect in state prosecutions has been noted. See
William K. Perry et al., State Attorneys General Encourage Voluntary Corporate Compliance
Programs, 2 CORP. CONDUCT Q. 49 (1993); NEW JERSEY ENvTL. PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, FACTORS
IN THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS
IN THE CONTEXT OF EFFECTIVELY OPERATION VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE/AUDIT PROGRAMS (1992)
(on file with author).
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not to prosecute. "In other words, even if you don't have a compliance
program at the time you come into the prosecutor's office, you ought
to think about setting up an effective one and offering this up as part
of a plea bargain or an agreement not to prosecute the corporation."
20 7
This concession, that firms may strengthen an ineffective
program, or even create one if none is present, is made because of the
difficulty both prosecutors and courts have had in determining what
"effective' compliance means, particularly in large and complex
corporate bureaucracies. What combination of ombudsmen, review
boards, hotlines, disciplinary mechanisms, internal audits, training
programs, and code complexity must be present to make such a
determination? How should prosecutors assess the commitment of
top management?
Prosecutors admit comfort with identifying the easy cases
where there is a "nice compliance program with a little gold seal at
the bottom and a frame around it, and the company's officers and
employees go out and violate the law anyway because the program is
not an effective one. '208 These easy cases may still exist within small,
privately-held firms, poorly counseled in preventive law. The real
challenge, if the corporate criminal law still has meaning, is the
comfort level of prosecutors and courts in evaluating compliance
effectiveness with those corporations that rarely if ever go to trial-
the large, diversified, publicly held corporation. Here, there simply
does not exist an accepted metric used to assess program design,
operation, and outcome.
Some commentators point to a growing consensus of what
constitutes an "effective" compliance program. This consensus is
reflected in the conditions and requirements of the court-imposed
criminal plea agreements and civil consent decrees against such firms
as National Medical Enterprises, Conrail, Con Edison, Caremark,
Grumman Corporation, and Prudential Securities. 20 9 Trying to distill
a set of objective, no less subjective, metrics from these cases requires
more creativity than is currently available. Moreover, these are a
very select few of the hundreds, if not thousands, of federal
investigations of organizations each year that never result in a
207. Litt, supra note 184, at 305.
208. Id. at 304.
209. See generally Kirk S. Jordan & Joseph E. Murphy, Compliance Programs: What the
Government Really Wants, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: HOW TO BE A GOOD CITIZEN CORPORA-
TION THROUGH SELF-POLICING, supra note 3, at 121 (discussing common elements of compliance
programs in civil antitrust cases, civil and criminal settlements in environmental cases, health
care fraud cases, defense contracting fraud cases, and an assortment of other settled civil
allegations).
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criminal indictment or trial. One must question whether the
importance of their treatment by prosecutors stems from significant
name recognition or the generalizability of regulatory treatment and
oversight.
Substituting intuitive determinations of compliance effective-
ness from regulators or courts risks significant error. Without an
internally consistent set of objective criteria, courts are as stymied as
business ethicists and compliance experts in providing anything but
limited anecdotal evidence of compliance effectiveness. 210  Prose-
cutorial discretion is neither guided nor constrained by reasonable
proxies of effectiveness. This would be less of a problem but for the
fact that the reach of the criminal and civil law is now determined by
the subjective discretion of prosecutors, who balance matters of
compliance effectiveness with concerns over the available resources of
their office. 211
A final effect of the risk shifting brought on by the passage of
the Guidelines is that the long-standing tradition of top management
indemnification has been undermined by incentives to discipline
agents across the corporate hierarchy, as well as distinct disincentives
if organizations choose otherwise. As one corporate counsel surmised,
there are multiple risks posed by indemnification, including: (1) an
increased perception of corporate irresponsibility, (2) the suggestion of
an organizational conspiracy, (3) a decreased mitigation score under
the Guidelines for failing to fully cooperate with prosecutors and
regulators, and (4) an increased likelihood of shareholder derivative
210. The difficulty with obtaining objective indicia of compliance effectiveness haunts
business ethics research on compliance. Evidence of increased reliance on compliance
procedures, such as a rise in the number of calls to an ethics office or an ethics hot line, may be
indicative of effectiveness (i.e., the existence of procedures reasonably capable of preventing law
violations), ineffectiveness (i.e., an increase in the extent of deviance within the firm), or both.
Courts are capable of assessing adherence to the prescriptive steps in the Guidelines, but
establishing adherence is quite different from assessing effectiveness. According to the National
Center for Preventive Law, "[w]hile some rudimentary tests are contained in the Sentencing
Guidelines and other legal standards, these tests provide little concrete direction on how to
create effective programs." NCPL, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PRINCIPLES III (1997) (on file with
author).
211. Perhaps the Advisory Group on Environmental Sanctions to the United States
Sentencing Commission proposed the most reasonable set of criteria to date. On December 6,
1993, this group reported a draft proposal of sanctions for organizations convicted of
environmental offenses. In evaluating the extent of a firm's environmental compliance, the
Working Group proposed that courts should consider: line management attention to compliance;
integration of environmental policies, standards, and procedures; auditing, monitoring,
reporting and tracking systems; regulatory expertise, training and evaluation; incentives for
compliance; disciplinary procedures; continuing evaluation and improvement; and other
innovative approaches. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT FROM ADVISORY GROUP ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL SANCTIONS § 9D1.1(a) 1-8 (1993).
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actions.212 Loss shifting practices that interfere with the prospect of
liability risk shifting are the latest casualty of the Guidelines.
3. Prosecutorial Strategy
Prosecutors are forthright about their discretionary strategy to
avoid vicarious liability. Guided by the spirit of formal Department of
Justice policies and a strong interest in minimizing the externalities
associated with corporate sanctions, United States Attorneys prize
active cooperation by the target company, proactive structural and
managerial changes designed to remedy organizational deficiencies, a
willingness to enter into consent civil judgments, and the payment of
significant civil and administrative fines.213
Resorting to civil remedies reflects a prosecutorial deference to
large corporations. There is a sense that it is imprudent to be
unnecessarily harsh when the social costs of a criminal indictment
against an organization with multiple stakeholders may be great.21 4
With the active cooperation of large organizations, prosecutorial
strategy also reflects a propensity for the criminal prosecution of
212. See generally Modern Pressures to Cooperate with Prosecutors Almost Make 'Defending
a Corporation' Oxymoronic, supra note 21.
213. See Cartusciello, supra note 126, at 3; Savage & Martz, supra note 20, at 13. For a
discussion of these policies, see generally Warin & Schwartz, supra note 129. Individual
governmental agencies have promulgated enforcement policies that guide regulatory and
prosecutorial activities. See Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for
Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 8987 (1998); Interim Policy on Compliance Incentives for Small
Businesses, 61 Fed. Reg. 27,984 (1996):
EPA will refrain from initiating an enforcement action seeking civil
penalties, or will mitigate civil penalties, whenever a small business makes a
good faith effort to comply with environmental requirements by receiving on-
site compliance assistance or promptly disclosing the findings of a
voluntarily conducted environmental audit, subject to certain conditions.
See also Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995) ("[W]here violations are found through voluntary
environmental audits or efforts that reflect a regulated entity's due diligence, and are promptly
disclosed and expeditiously corrected, EPA will not seek gravity-based (i.e., non-economic
benefit) penalties and will generally not recommend criminal prosecution against the regulated
entity.'). For a general outline of these regulations, see Paula J. Desio, The Regulatory
Environment and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, Ass'n for Practical and Profl
Ethics, Feb. 26, 1999 (on file with author).
214. See generally Wallace N. Davidson, I & Dan L. Worrell, The Impact of
Announcements of Corporate Illegalities on Shareholder Returns, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 195 (1988);
Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear From
Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757 (1993) (discussing the reputational cost of
fraud); Alan K. Reichert et al., The Impact of Illegal Business Practice on Shareholder Returns,
31 FIN. REV. 67 (1996). For an example of an organization and its agents facing civil and
criminal liability for the same acts, see United States v. Andrews, 136 F.3d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(upholding the indictment of the CEO and president of a corporation that had already been fined
$500,000 for securities fraud).
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middle management, supervisory personnel, and subordinate
employees. Most important, the perceived power and authority of the
Guidelines' incentives, as well as the transparency and signaling of
strategy, support a view that compliance is risk management. Firms
use compliance to their significant advantage, as a means of avoiding
the imputation of criminal liability.215  That this is no mere
speculation, observe how the firm's cost of pure risk has been
minimized though management's control and discipline of its agents.
In fact, in tracing the evolution of corporate criminal liability
in the context of the many other risk shifting mechanisms used to
transfer tort or contract liability, one concludes that considerations of
strategic risk management account for a large number of the
historical shifts. This is not to say that the rise and fall of vicarious
liability, the recognition of common law corporate governance
principles, or the consideration of various defenses to both criminal
and civil liability may be traced to a systematic risk management
process. 216  Rather, organizations must be credited with actively
managing and controlling risks of liability and loss.
B. The Meaning of Compliance
Scholars considering a corporate due diligence defense have
asked the rhetorical question: Can a corporation save its soul?2 17
Standing alone, this question makes sense to those who believe that
some, if not many corporations, genuinely seek compliance as a
function of good corporate citizenship. Corporations adopt integrity-
based management initiatives through strong and courageous
leadership. Compliance is an empowered accountability that is driven
down the corporate hierarchy through the firm's structure, processes,
and decisions. Compliance should be institutionalized to shape "an
organization's guiding values, to create an environment that supports
ethically sound behavior, and to instill a sense of shared accounta-
bility among employees. 218
215. For a general treatment of risk management, see generally NEIL A. DOHERTY,
CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT: A FINANCIAL ExPOSITION (1985); JAMES S. TRIESCHMANN &
SANDRA G. GUSTAVSON, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE (10th ed. 1998).
216. A systematic risk management process is an ongoing, systematic identification and
evaluation of risks, followed by the selection and implementation of risk management
techniques. For a discussion of risk analysis, more generally, see infra Part II.D.
217. See, e.g., Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a
Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605 (1995).
Notably, there was no attribution to Lord Thurlow.
218. Paine, supra note 130, at 111.
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This question of corporate salvation appears naive to those
who see more strategic utility in corporate compliance than moral-
ity.219 Those who think it nave would argue, as I have here, that the
Guidelines must be seen within the larger context of the positioning of
firms relative to the strategic management of risks. The Commission
responded to the business lobby by giving those firms with the
necessary resources and counsel a definitive risk shifting mechanism
backed by the legitimate pretext of employee compliance to law. This
pretext allows for the integration of compliance into an overall
corporate strategy, while encouraging a convergence of agency
interests. Organizations can hold themselves out as having integrity,
diligence, and a commitment to law without excessive monitoring
expenditures. Agents can minimize bonding costs by effortlessly
endorsing business conduct principles, codes of ethics, and compliance
standards that are consistent with their values and beliefs, and at the
same time reflect firm policy.
Finally, there is an even more critical view of the "good
corporate citizenship" movement. Corporate compliance is perhaps
best conceptualized as an effort on the part of firms to extend the
management of liability risks to the point of insurance or self-
insurance. Whether compliance is driven by the preventive law
strategies of corporate counsel or integrated seamlessly into the audit
and control functions of the firm, "good corporate citizenship" is an
elaborate and well-dressed variation of fidelity insurance or fidelity
bonding-with a clever risk shifting twist.
All three views, and any combination of these views, are found
in the conceptual continuum that represents the explicit or implicit
rationale for corporate compliance practices. 220 As we shall see below
and later in Part IV, problems arise when there are limited incentives
to do more than see compliance as risk-driven strategy, when a firm's
message of compliance stands in contrast to incentive and reward
systems that reinforce a very different culture, and when the dogma
of leadership is inconsistent with prevailing business practices.2 2 1
219. Though not necessarily intended, this question implies that compliance can affect
corporate, if not moral, salvation. See generally Greg Baldwin & John Campbell, Sentencing
Rules Point Way to Organizational Salvation, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Jan. 1995, at 8.
220. See Laufer, A Study of Small Business Complaince Practices, supra note 1, at 147.
221. See generally Erik Jansen & Mary Ann Von Glinow, Ethical Ambivalence and
Organizational Reward Systems, 10 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 814 (1985).
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C. Compliance as Integrity
Several years ago, Professor Paine divided corporate strategies
for ethics management into two categories: compliance and
integrity.222 Compliance seeks conformity with laws and regulations.
It is designed to prevent corporate and white-collar crime. It is
championed by legal counsel. It is controlled by audits and strict
penalties. It assumes that all employees are driven by material self-
interest.223 Yet integrity is guided by ethical values and commitments
that are clearly communicated by corporate leaders with a strong
personal commitment to an ethical culture. These values and
commitments are integrated into the normal channels of management
decision-making. They are reinforced by organizational systems and
structures. With integrity management, top and middle managers
are empowered to make ethically sound decisions. 24
Elsewhere I have argued that the virtue of corporate integrity
may be captured in law by the Guidelines' conception of
organizational due diligence, at least in theory. 2 5 Due diligence can
be an organizing virtue that imposes both ethical and legal obligations
on corporations and their agents.226 First, it requires the articulation
of ethical standards of conduct. 27 Second, due diligence must satisfy
222. See generally Paine, supra note 130. Paine's integrity strategy compares favorably
with the "compliance" strategy found in the Guidelines, as well as the interactive corporate
compliance strategy articulated in JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E. MURPHY, INTERACTIVE
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO REGULATORY COMPULSION (1988). Notably, Sigler
and Murphy focus on management commitment, education and awareness, and implementation
and control. See also Alan R. Yuspeh & Rebecca E. Goodell, Terms Such as 'Compliance
Program,' 'Ethics Program' Aren't Synonymous, Prevention of Corp. Liab. (BNA) 8 (Nov. 1995);
Are Compliance and Ethics Related?, BENCHMARKS, Mar. 1994, at 3. See generally Winthrop M.
Swenson, An Effective Program to Prevent and Detect Violations of Law, in KAPLAN, supra note
3, at § 4, § 4.07.75.
223. See Paine, supra note 130, at 113.
224. See id. at 112.
225. See Peter A. French, Integrity, Intentions, and Corporations, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 141,
152-53 (1996):
Hence, it should make sense to say that corporations may act in ways that
are consistent with the virtue of integrity. What that means, as I
understand it, is that corporations can adopt policies that require them to
continually pursue the truth of their corporate commitments and that
regularly expose their convictions and corporate policies and procedures to
moral scrutiny.
See also William S. Laufer, Integrity, supra note 7 (responding to French's commentary on
integrity); ROBERT C. SOLOMON, ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE: COOPERATION AND INTEGRITY IN
BUSINESS 168-74 (1992).
226. See generally CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: HOW TO BE A GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION
THROUGH SELF-POLICING, supra note 3.
227. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 43, at § 8A1.2 commentary at
3(k)(1)-(7).
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an intentionality requirement by demanding action in accordance
with these self-selected and self-imposed values.228 Third, it compels
the acceptance of responsibility, and the affirmative obligation to
disclose practices that violate the law.229 And finally, due diligence
imposes responsible proactive and reactive behavior on firms
consistent with prescribed standards of conduct.230
That due diligence actually reflects organizational integrity is,
in the last, a matter of faith. Even scholars with allegiance to
integrity-based strategies can point to only a select number of
organizations that meet or exceed expectations.231  When examples
are offered, they are most often part of the membership of a business
ethics association, e.g. the Ethics Officers Association. For the vast
majority of organizations, however, it seems fair to conclude that the
consideration of "ethics are tangential and warrant consideration only
as an optic in response to a short-term crisis. 12 32  Research on the
institutionalization of ethics compliance initiatives is also less than
encouraging.233 Perhaps most significant, the real function of due
diligence and the rhetoric of the "good citizen" corporation movement
must be seen in light of the historical evolution of liability risk
shifting. Within this context, one tends to discount some-if not
much-of the inspiration from the rallying cry of its leaders. What
does it mean when the Chairman of the United States Sentencing
Commission inaugurates a conference designed for corporate legal
departments by proclaiming the importance of good citizenship and
228. French notes that "the person of integrity is required to have a specific set of
intentions... to pursue the proper moral principles and the truth of one's convictions." French,
supra note 225, at 146; see also RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, COMPETING WITH INTEGRITY IN INTER-
NATIONAL BUSINESS 39 (1993).
229. See French, supra note 225, at 153 ('What that means, as I understand it, is that
corporations can adopt policies that require them to continually pursue the truth of their
corporate commitments and that regularly expose their convictions and corporate policies and
procedures to moral scrutiny.").
230. As French has argued, corporate integrity is more than mere desires or beliefs.
Integrity involves corporate planning and action, consistent with corporate policies. In law, due
diligence is conceived of by degree and extent. See generally French, supra note 225.
231. See Robert H. Frank, Can Socially Responsible Firms Survive in a Competitive
Environment?, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS (David M.
Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
232. JOHN DALLA COSTA, THE ETHICAL IMPERATIVE: WHY MORAL LEADERSHIP IS GOOD
BUSINESS 97 (1998). For scholarly research on the role of leadership and ethics, more generally,
see, e.g., Georges Enderle, Some Perspectives of Managerial Ethical Leadership, 6 J. Bus.
ETHICS 657 (1987); Patrick E. Murphy & Georges Enderle, Managerial Ethical Leadership:
Examples Do Matter, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q. 117 (1995) (discussing the role of ethical leadership in
four companies).
233. See infra Part III.A.
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the need to embrace those values that promote law abidance?23 4
These remarks are placed in proper context by the evolution in the
meaning of corporate compliance over the last decade.
D. Compliance as Risk Management
The history of corporate compliance following the deliberations
of the Sentencing Commission is marked by the immediate
transformation of guidelines designed for use by federal judges in
fashioning sentences, to principles that serve a complementary
preventive law and internal control function.235 In the life of an
organization, these principles are used in functions most
appropriately and accurately described as risk management. 23 6
234. See Richard P. Conaboy, Welcome and Conference Overview, in PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 1, at 3, 5 ("[Tlhose of you here today from the business community are in a position to do
more than the bare minimum in taking a stand against crime. You must take on the obligation
to lead this effort, to be in the forefront, not only by working to ensure that your companies'
employees follow the law but by embracing and placing at the very top of your companies'
priorities the basic good citizenship values that make law abidance possible.'. For a lay
discussion of the potential for exploitation of the compliance movement, see Saundra Torry,
Tougher Penalties on Corporate Crime Raise Rich Opportunities, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1992, at
F5 ('The federal government's new guidelines to toughen penalties for corporations that break
the law have set off a booming business for lawyers, who are rushing to teach their clients how
to stay out of trouble or soften the blow when they don't.').
235. See Laurence A. Urgenson, Voluntary Disclosure: Opportunities and Issues for the
Mid-1990's, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AFTER CAREMARK, supra note 3, at 785, 788 ('The
principle goal of compliance, however, is not to mitigate sentences, but to avoid indictment in
the first place.'); see also Dana H. Freyer, Corporate Compliance Programs for FDA-Regulated
Companies: Incentives for Their Development and the Impact of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for Organizations, 51 FOOD DRUG L.J. 225, 229-30 (1996) ("An organization that, as a
result of its compliance program, has detected unlawful activities and reported such acts to the
appropriate regulatory agency has a powerful argument against indictment for such conduct.").
Similar to the organization of post-Guidelines' risk management systems, the seven prescribed
elements of the Guidelines are divided into three categories: Establishing Compliance Program
(establishing compliance standards and procedures reasonably capable of reducing the prospect
of criminal conduct); Structure and Control (assignment of high-level employees to oversee
compliance efforts; using due care not to delegate significant discretionary authority; taking
reasonable steps to communicate standards effectively); and Response to Violations and
Incidents (taking reasonable steps to achieve compliance; consistent enforcement of standards;
taking reasonable steps upon the discovery of an offense, as well as preventing further similar
offenses). See id. at 235-39.
236. See generally JAMES S. TRIESCHMANN & SANDRA G. GUSTAVSON, RISK MANAGEMENT
AND INSURANCE (1998); Dana H. Freyer & Benjamin B. Klubes, A Practical Approach to
Implementing a Corporate Compliance Program for Smaller Companies, PREVENTIVE L. REP.,
Winter 1994, at 33.
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Table 1: Models of Compliance as Risk Management
Compliance as Preventive Law
National Center for Preventive Law:
Twenty Principles of Corporate Compliance
Establishing Compliance Program
1. Organizations should pursue compliance through the creation and maintenance of an effective compliance
program.
2. An effective compliance program is designed to prevent, detect and respond to legal risks and to promote
compliance with law.
3. An effective compliance program is a dynamic process that is designed to be flexible and modified, when
appropriate, to reflect changing conditions
4. An effective compliance program states that it is the organization's policy to comply with all applicable
laws.
5. The highest governing authority within the organization endorses the compliance program
6. An effective compliance program establishes accountability for compliance throughout the organization.
7. An effective compliance program is designed to operate fairly and equitably.
Structure and Control
8. Specific high-level personnel in an organization are responsible for the administration and oversight of the
compliance program.
9. A compliance program has the support of senior management of the organization. Each officer, manager
and employee is responsible for supporting and complying with the compliance program's standards and
procedures.
10. The organization exercises due diligence to determine whether persons to whom substantial discretionary
authority is delegated have a propensity to engage in illegal activities and to prevent such delegation to
those persons.
Response to Violations and Incidents
11. The organization takes reasonable steps to achieve compliance with its standards and the law.
12. An effective compliance program is proactive in its approach to dealing with incidents of noncompliance.
13. An effective compliance program possesses or has access to investigatory, valuative and reporting
resources.
14. An effective compliance program addresses the occasions for external reporting of violations of law.
15. An effective compliance program utilizes incidents of noncompliance to evaluate its own effectiveness, to
correct deficiencies and to effect improvements.
Training Programs-Making the System Effective
16. The organization's compliance program has a communications component, the objectives of which are to
make employees and other agents aware of applicable standards of conduct and to promote compliance.
17. An effective communications program is designed to reach the intended audience.
18. An effective compliance program communicates appropriate information to the organization's employees
and other agents.
19. All levels of management are responsible for the operation of the organization's communications program
concerning compliance.
20. Incentives and disincentives are significant tools in promoting compliance.
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Compliance as Internal Control
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO): Internal Control System Evaluation
Control Environment-
1. Does management adequately convey the message that integrity cannot be compromised? Does a
positive control environment exist, whereby there is an attitude of control consciousness throughout the
organization, and a positive "tone at the top"? Is the competence of the entity's people commensurate
with their responsibilities? Is managements operating style, the way it assigns authority and
responsibility and organizes and develops its people, appropriate? Does the board provide the right level
of attention?
Risk Assessment
2. Are entity-wide objectives and supporting activity-level objectives established and linked? Are the
internal and external risks that influence the success or failure of the achievement of the objectives
identified and assessed? Are mechanisms in place to identify changes affecting the entity's ability to
achieve its objectives? Are policies and procedures modified as needed?
Control Activities:
3. Are control activities in place to ensure adherence to established policy and the carrying out of actions to
address the related risks? Are there appropriate control activities for each of the entity's activities?
Information and Communication
4. Are information systems in place to identify and capture pertinent information-financial and non-
financial, relating to external and internal events-and bring it to personnel in a form that enables
them to carry out their responsibilities? Does communication of relevant information take place? Is it
clear with respect to expectations and responsibilities of individuals and groups, and reporting of
results? And does communication occur down, across and upward in the entity, as well as between the
entity and other parties?
Monitoring
5. Are appropriate procedures in place to monitor on an ongoing basis, or to periodically evaluate the
functioning of the other components of internal control? Are deficiencies reported to the right people?
Are policies and procedures modified as needed?
As Table 1 suggests, a common set of risk management
principles were gleaned from the Guidelines' notion of due diligence
by the National Center for Preventive Law ("NCPL"), as well as by the
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations ("COSO") of the Treadway
Commission. 237 The Guidelines and principles require the articulation
of standards of conduct, delegation of compliance management to
responsible personnel, appropriate monitoring in light of risks, and
237. See NCPL, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PRINCIPLES (1997) (on file with author); NCPL'S
TWENTY PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE (1998) (on file with author); COSO, INTERNAL
CONTROL-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (1994) (on fie with author). The principles in COSO were
first published in a four-volume report in 1992. For a discussion of the first publication and its
etiology, see generally Committee on Law and Accounting, "Management" Reports On Internal
ControL A Legal Perspective, 49 BUs. LAW. 889 (1994). The history leading to the COSO
Principles is also detailed in the text COSO, INTERNAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 93-98
(1994).
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reasonable responses to the discovery of corporate illegalities. 218 The
NCPL's Principles of Corporate Compliance and the Internal Control
Framework of COSO, however, extend the somewhat elementary
notion of due diligence found in the Guidelines.23 9
NCPL principles represent the strategic use of due diligence as
legal risk management and as "principles of legal risk reduction. '240
NCPL Working Groups provide a blueprint for corporate counsel in
the design and implementation of compliance programs that are cost-
effective, that maximize legal value, and that minimize the risks
associated with employee deviance. 241 The Working Group Draft on
Establishing Compliance Programs, for example, guides counsel on
the preservation of a firm's legal rights and privileges while
structuring the incentives guiding compliance initiatives, the need to
continually examine incentives that promote deviance, and the
identification and explanation of the reasons for liability-causing
conduct.242
By contrast, COSO incorporates principles of due diligence into
a larger paradigm of internal control, which offers a concept of inte-
grated risk management. Integrated approaches conceive of risk
management as a process. They require an effective control structure.
They articulate a common risk language.243 The five interrelated
238. See Paul E. Fiorelli & Cynthia J. Rooney, COSO and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Apr. 1997, at 57 (comparing the Guidelines and COSO in
relation to the control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and
communication, and monitoring); K. Raghunandan & D.V. Rama, Management Reports After
COSO, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Aug. 1994, at 54 (discussing the extent to which reports of internal
control are relied on by the Fortune 100 companies).
239. See, e.g., Catherine Collins McCoy & John A. Galotto, The COSO Report on Internal
Control: Implications for Public Companies and Executives, INSIGHTS, Aug. 1993, at 29.
240. NCPL, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 237, at i; see also Edward A.
Dauer, Preventive Law Dictates Going to Root Causes to Prevent Claims from Arising,
PREVENTIVE L. REP., Sept. 1988, at 12; Lynn E. Pollan, Training Managers: Problem Prevention
By In-House Counsel, ACCA DOCKET, Fall 1994, at 76, 76 ("Corporate legal policies are designed
to achieve compliance with laws and minimize unnecessary risks and losses.").
241. NCPL Principles 2 prescribes that: "An effective compliance program is designed to
prevent, detect and respond to legal risks and to promote compliance with the law." NCPL,
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 237, at 6. The factors to be considered include:
(1) identifying liability-causing conduct based on industry or organizational
experience, as well as the occasions for such conduct; (2) identifying non-
obvious and incipient misconduct that tends to promote illegal actions; and
(3) structuring compliance practices to be effective, while still enhancing an
organization's business, assets and goodwill and preserving its legal
privileges and rights.
Id. at 7.
242. See NCPL, WORKING GROUP DRAFT: ESTABLISHING COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS: PRINCIPLE
2 (1998) (on file with author).
243. See Dave Lenckus, Concentric Risk Programs Mean Big Business, Bus. INS., Apr. 14,
1997, at 98 (discussing the value of an integrated (concentric) program designed for Fidelity
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components of internal control work as a process to ensure
operational effectiveness and efficiency, reliable financial reporting,
and legal and regulatory compliance. 244
The value of COSO is found in its integration of primary risk
management functions. The environment, activities, and processes of
an organization interact in meaningful ways across the five
components of control. The control environment serves as a founda-
tion for the assessment of compliance risks by management. Control
activities ensure that the compliance message of management is
conveyed through established channels of communication. Finally,
the entire internal control process is actively monitored. The singular
objective is to provide reasonable assurance of achieving compliance
objectives.
The rhetoric of the "good citizen" corporation movement seems
transparent when compliance is conceived of as the integrated
management of legal risks with either NCPL or COSO principles.
Organizational culture, ethos, values, and the notion of compliance
effectiveness assume a distinct operational and instrumental
meaning. "Compliance programming," according to one compliance
officer, "is just like any other risk management activity. What organi-
zation would go light today on insurance just because it has never
been sued for property damage or personal injury?"245
The analogy to insurance is instructive. When compliance
initiatives become an integral and instrumental part of a firm's
management of risks, or even a lesser part of an audit function,
consider how similar the compliance rationale is to that which
supports corporate insurance and self-insurance. 2 6 After all, we are
told that both are "required" risk shifting and risk retaining
mechanisms.
Investments); Todd L. Williams, An Integrated Approach to Risk Management, RISK MGMT.,
July 1996, at 22 (discussing an integrated perspective as one requiring a focus on pure and
speculative risk).
244. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 170 (discussing COSO and internal control in the
context of a board's responsibilities).
245. Herbert I. Zinn, Boxing With Pandora-An Analysis of Management's Role in
Sustaining the Effectiveness of a Compliance Program, in ORGANIZING FOR CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE: TOWARD STANDARDS 133, 141 (1995).
246. Management may talk of mutual trust when unveiling a compliance plan,
but employees often receive the message as a warning from on high. Indeed,
the more skeptical among them may view compliance programs as nothing
more than liability insurance for senior management. This is not an
unreasonable conclusion, considering that compliance programs rarely
address the root causes of misconduct.
Paine, supra note 130, at 111.
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
E. Compliance as Insurance and Self-Insurance
Traditional insurance products are made available to organiza-
tions for a host of compliance-related risks, from losses caused by the
fraudulent acts of rogue traders, to the costs of violating environ-
mental statutes.247 The range of fidelity policies available to firms,
with coverage for virtually every crime and tort, is remarkable.
2 48
With each policy or coverage, the insured (organization) pays a price
that effectively transfers the risk of loss associated with law viola-
tions to a third-party insurer (insurance company). To the extent that
organizations spend considerable resources in the name of risk
management to internalize the costs of compliance failures, how
similar is this to the risk retention and risk funding rationale that
has driven many large corporations to self-insure?249 How similar are
the reasons for traditional insurance with the rationale of firms that
purchase compliance in order to shift risk of liability away from the
entity?
The short answer to both of these questions is that there are a
surprising number of similarities even though the purchase of compli-
ance fails to meet most, if not all, of the legal requirements and non-
legal assumptions of insurance and other risk financing alternatives.
Instead of maintaining a fund to pay claims for covered employees, as
is the case in traditional forms of self-insurance, firms purchase
compliance to ensure against the inevitability of compliance failures.
This "fidelity" insurance is as much self-insurance (not to mention
self-protection) as the purchase of a fire extinguisher by a concerned
homeowner. 250
The primary justification for the purchase of compliance, how-
ever, is to insure that employee infidelity will be viewed as an indi-
247. See PAUL K. FREEMAN & HOWARD KUNREUTHER, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
THROUGH INSURANCE (1997); Edwin Unsworth, Lloyd's Offers Cover for Rogue Trading, BUS.
INS., Oct. 13, 1997, at 25; Edwin Unsworth, 'Rogue Trader' Risks Covered By New Policy, Bus.
INS., Feb. 16, 1998, at 55.
248. See, e.g., Thomas K. Bourke, Their Own Worst Enemies, BUS. INS., June 29, 1992, at
56; R. Mark Keenan & Pablo Quinones, Unraveling the Mystery of Insurance Coverage for
Criminal Losses, HUM. RESOURCES PROF., July-Aug. 1998, at 28.
249. For an outline of the common motivations for self-insurance, see HERBERT S.
DENENBERG ET AL., RISK AND INSURANCE 126-27 (2d ed. 1974). For a discussion of insurance in
relation to tort and environmental law, see generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental
Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942 (1988); Gary T. Schwartz, The
Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELLL. REV. 313, 316-17 (1990).
250. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An
Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 146 n.72 (1990) ('Tire
extinguishers constitute a form of self-insurance; they are 'consumed' to reduce the expected
cost of an accident.").
1402 [Vol. 52:1343
1999] PARADOX OF COMPLL4NCE 1403
vidual, rather than a corporate act. Compliance, like insurance, is a
method of greatly reducing a known risk. Consistent with the view
that organizations are utility maximizers, and with the pretext of
"good corporate citizenship," organizations simply select compliance
purchases at the minimum level of expenditure necessary to shift
liability to the agent. 251 Any expenditure beyond this level may be
seen as inefficient. The costs to the firm are highest where there is
little-to-no compliance (costs rise due to significant employee deviance
that is imputed to the firm), and overcompliance (employee deviance
is not imputed to the entity, but costs rise due to compliance expendi-
tures). Firms maintain a level of compliance within an operating
range that minimizes costs while at the same time shifting liability.252
Even with these similarities, no one would suggest that the
purchase of compliance satisfies many of the nonlegal and the legal
requirements of insurance or, for that matter, self-insurance. Courts
have carefully drawn definitions challenging the deductibility of
premiums as business expenses, requiring for proof of insurance a
251. Compliance and risk management experts are asked to institutionalize programs and
initiatives that satisfy the "requirements" of the Guidelines. The orientation of the compliance
industry is cost-effective risk reduction. Compliance products are marketed and sold as
commercial insurance is brokered. See Dana Freyer & Joseph Murphy, Obvious Legal Risks-
Hidden Business Rewards, 3 CORP. CONDUCT Q. 28 (1994) (discussing how to sell compliance as
a business advantage: compliance reduces insurance costs and increases employee morale); Peg.
A. Schoenfelder, Preventive Law 'Marketing Tips" for Corporate Counsel, PREVENTIVE L. REP.,
Fall 1995, at 19 (reviewing the business benefits of implementing minimal compliance
programs); Lisa A. Whitney, Marketing to the Corporate Client, ACCA DOCKET, May-June 1995,
at 40 (discussing how to "keep an eye" on the bottom line in marketing programs and services).
"Carefully planned and implemented compliance programs," corporate counsel are told, "can
reduce these risks by preventing illegal conduct and mitigating or eliminating punishment and
liabilities for those offenses which still occur." NCPL, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PRINCIPLES,
supra note 237, at i.
252. A depiction of this, as an ideal function, appears below.
Hypothetical cost
100
Minimum Maximum
expenditure expenditureexpenit e
required to required to
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risk to agent 10 risk to agen
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clear showing of risk shifting and risk distribution.253 Risk shifting is
narrowly defined by courts as the transfer of the risk of loss from one
entity to another. Risk distribution requires a showing that losses
will be spread across entities. Self-insurance, on the contrary,
requires some risk-retention in addition to funding, and encompasses
a wide range of risk-financing alternatives to traditional insurance. 25 4
Notwithstanding these critical differences and generous
violations of assumptions, the underlying rationales for underwriting
compliance (shifting risk of loss to agents and minimizing costs due to
compliance failures) are remarkably similar to those which support a
more broad interpretation of insurance and self-insurance. 255 Consider
the central role of risk transference and risk control in both the
purchase of insurance as well as compliance. Consider, in addition,
that self-insurance may be conceptualized broadly as "any plan of risk
retention in which a program or procedure has been established to
meet the adverse results of a financial loss. ''256 Such an interpretation
supports risk retention and risk funding plans that fail the legal
requirements of pooling and inviolate reserves, but are nevertheless
conceived of as self-insurance in many businesses.2 57
If it is true that firms purchase compliance as risk manage-
ment to the point of insurance and generally minimize costs by
spending only that amount necessary to effectively shift liability, it is
critically important to consider how this might affect incentives and
disincentives to institutionalize law abidance in firms. Such a con-
sideration must address the adverse consequences, if any, of firms
purchasing compliance in a manner similar to the purchase of
insurance. 258
253. See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941) ("Historically and commonly
insurance involves risk-shifting and risk-distributing.').
254. See, e.g., James M. Fischer, The Presence of Insurance and the Legal Allocation of
Risk, 2 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1996).
255. See, e.g., Jill B. Berkeley, Recent Developments in Self-Insurance Law, 33 TORT & INS.
L.J. 693, 693-94 (1998) ("Self-insurance is a broad and relatively amorphous term that has been
inconsistently used to describe any entity that lacks commercial insurance, either altogether or
that otherwise retains ascertainable portions of its own risk.").
256. DENENBERG, supra note 249, at 125.
257. See id.
258. This question raises, more generally, the problem of moral hazard. See Thomas S.
Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 326 n.65 (1993) ("Moral
hazard is an adverse consequence of having insurance. It is defined as the increased probability
of an insurable loss that arises solely because a person has insurance.").
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IV. MORAL HAZARD AND THE FuTURE OF COMPLIANCE
For many years the problem of moral hazard, and its accom-
panying inefficiencies, was discussed in relation to insurance con-
tracts. 259 Scholars debated the detrimental effect that insurance has
on an insured's incentives to avoid losses associated with a host of
avoidable and unavoidable events, e.g., an automobile accident or
house fire. Insurers concluded that a combination of the character of
the insured and the incentives (or disincentives) from the purchase of
insurance prompted a distinct risk of loss. Where an insured is of
poor moral character, the purchase of insurance results in a
temptation to engage in risk bearing behaviors. 260 Short of taking
optimal precautions, which is uncharacteristic of the morally weak,
empirical research supported the experience and intuitions of a
growing insurance industry. An insurance contract may compromise
incentives, affecting an individual's care and activity levels, as well as
the likelihood of loss. 261 In short, "insurance inevitably increases the
occurrence, magnitude, or cost of that which is insured against. '262
Kenneth Arrow first discussed the economics of moral hazard
in the context of health insurance in 1963.263 Over the next three
decades, the notion of moral hazard was extended to all forms of
insurance. Scholars stretched its impact past traditional insurance to
any situation where one party's action may affect the risk of loss
assumed by another.264 Neoclassical economists found moral hazard
problems in strict product liability regimes, cases of contributory
259. See, e.g., Ralph A. Winter, Moral Hazard and Insurance Contracts, in CONTRIBUTIONS
TO INSURANCE ECONOMICS 61 (Georges Dionne ed., 1992) (considering the optimal insurance
under moral hazard).
260. For a discussion of the origins of moral hazard, generally, see Baker, supra note 27
(tracing the origins of moral hazard to the nineteenth century fire insurance trade and, before
that, to marine insurance).
261. An individual's care and activity level have distinct meanings. See generally Steven
Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541 (1979).
262. Baker, supra note 27, at 241.
263. Arrow's article sparked an invaluable debate over the incentives and disincentives
created by government-sponsored health insurance. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963); see also Mark V. Pauly, The
Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1968); Kenneth J. Arrow, The
Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 537 (1968).
264. See, e.g., Hanson & Logue, supra note 250; Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding
Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 HARV. L. REV. 507 (1994); Mancur Olson, A
Less Ideological Way of Deciding How Much Should Be Given to the Poor, DAEDALUS, Fall 1983,
at 217; George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981).
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negligence, worker's compensation benefits, and virtually all agency
relations.265
In recent years, the notion of moral hazard has been used to
explain the perverse consequences of such good-intentioned and
socially-minded initiatives as welfare programs for the poor, product
liability coverage for the injured, and health insurance for the sick.
As some commentators have observed, albeit with much suspicion, the
lesson of neoclassical moral hazard theory is that the more one tries
to safeguard against the consequences of poverty, accidents, and
uncompensated illness, the greater the likelihood of poverty, injuries,
and illness. 266 Attempts to minimize the consequences of certain risk
bearing behaviors through compensation (which approximates insur-
ance) will do nothing more than encourage additional risk taking and
loss.
The problem of moral hazard would be inapplicable to corpo-
rate compliance if such initiatives aligned principal/agent incentives,
if compliance programs prompted meaningful ethical change in
organizations, if compliance was more than a guise for strategic risk
management, and if the rationale for purchasing compliance did not
resemble the objectives of insurance and self-insurance. It is more
than likely that ex ante moral hazards pose a problem, however, given
that expenditures for compliance are bounded by risk shifting and
risk management rationales. The likelihood increases significantly
when one adds the inability of prosecutors and courts to objectively
judge the effectiveness of compliance efforts together with research
revealing that organizations resist meaningful cultural change. The
prospects of moral hazards are as much confirmed after viewing the
evidence that corporate deviance is often tolerated, if not tacitly
encouraged, by an implicit agenda of top management-where
compliance initiatives originate. 267
265. See Winter, supra note 259, at 63 ('The importance of moral hazard extends beyond
the context of insurance to the entire paradigm of agency theory.').
266. Baker does a wonderful job in undermining the logic of this "conventional lesson." He
maintains that key assumptions supporting the economics of moral hazard are violated. See
Baker, supra note 27, at 276.
267. After paying that minimum expenditure toward compliance necessary to shift liability
downward, firms have reduced incentives to ensure against deviance. Organizations at the
lower operating range of compliance are, for obvious reasons, most at risk. Here the cost is
minimal, a primary objective of compliance is achieved, and, with an often less than genuine
commitment of top management, deviance or pressures leading to deviance may be encouraged
with little to no risk to the firm.
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A. Cosmetic Compliance and Institutional Inertia
It is difficult to find practitioners who are critical of corporate
compliance initiatives.268  In-house counsel are taught to see
compliance efforts as preventive law; ethics consultants are
frequently lured by a blind devotion to the ideal of promoting "good
corporate citizenship," not to mention the generous compensation
offered for their consultation; and regulators and prosecutors delight
in the ease with which they may obtain inculpatory evidence through
voluntary disclosure programs and other shrewd incentives. 269 Even
though critics are hard to find, the scholarly literature in manage-
ment and business ethics is rife with evidence of the impotence of
business conduct principles and ethics codes, and the resistance of
corporate culture to an institutionalization of ethics. Though not all
268. Initiatives include codes of conduct, ethics training programs, procedures for reporting
violations, disciplinary mechanisms, and disclosure procedures. See generally Laufer, A Study
of Small Business Complaince Practices, supra note 1. In a remarkable exception, Senator
Edward Kennedy cautioned the attendees of the Commission-sponsored Second Symposium On
Crime and Punishment in the United States, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 115, 119:
Members of the business community and those who counsel corporate clients
must recognize that there will always be skepticism about a policy that gives
any break to corporations that have committed crimes, as the guidelines will
sometimes do when a corporation demonstrates a solid compliance program.
That skepticism will grow if the public comes to believe that companies are
approaching the guidelines with a 'window dressing' compliance effort and a
clever law firm waiting in the wings at the first sign of trouble.
See also Richard Rocchini & Mark S. Olinsky, Is Your Legal Compliance Program Merely a
Paper Tiger?, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, June 1994, at 29 (reviewing the inadequacy of compliance
efforts).
269. See Laurence A. Urgenson, supra note 235, at 225; Corporate Self-Policing Programs,
1 CORP. CONDUCT Q. 11 (1991); Perry, supra note 206. Evidence was not always so easy to come
by. See, e.g., John Braithwaite & Gilbert Geis, On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime
Control, 28 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 292, 298 (1982) (arguing that the prosecution often loses in
corporate crime cases because firms can exploit the complexity of the corporate form and
"corporate reality). As John Shenefield has observed, the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice has taken a cautious approach to compliance programs:
Nothing will quite so clearly demonstrate empty formalism or lack of
conviction than a program that includes irrelevancies adopted untested and
unscreened from the program of other companies with quite different
problems .... Employees at lower levels in any organization surely take
their cue from top management. If the head of the company doesn't take the
program seriously, neither will anyone else.
John H. Shenefield, Compliance Programs as Viewed from the Antitrust Division, 48 ANTITRUST
L.J. 73, 74-75 (1979). Voluntary disclosure of inculpatory evidence raises significant liability
issues that remain unresolved. See generally Michael Goldsmith & Chad W. King, Policing
Corporate Crime: The Dilemma of Internal Compliance Programs, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1997);
John Calvin Conway, Note, Self-Evaluative Privilege and Corporate Compliance Audits, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 621 (1995).
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are so pessimistic, it is easy to reach a conclusion that "ethical reform
from within the system is largely cosmetic."27 °
A consistent stream of research over the past fifteen years has
revealed that ethics codes do not relieve organizational pressures to
be unethical or convince senior management to become more socially
responsible.2 71 A consensus of opinion has formed that generic ethics
codes are often adopted for the appearance of legitimacy and legal
protection.2 7 2 There is also equivocal evidence of the utility of firm-
and-industry specific codes. 273  Such codes are not perceived to be
effective in changing employee attitudes or behavior. In fact, they are
often viewed as serving the company's interests over its employees. 27 4
Survey research also reveals that a majority of employees see ethics
270. COSTA, supra note 232, at 97.
271. See Donald R. Cressey & Charles A. Moore, Managerial Values and Corporate Codes of
Ethics, CAL. MGMT. REV., Summer 1983, at 53 (discussing their survey of 119 corporations).
272. See Susan J. Harrington, The Effect of Codes of Ethics and Personal Denial of
Responsibility on Computer Abuse Judgments and Intentions, 20 M.I.S. Q. 257, 260 (1996)
("Another potential problem with generic codes is that much of what is in typical codes is only
intended as a public relations gimmick or a means of protecting the corporation from legal
liability."); Bruce N. Kaye, Codes of Ethics in Australian Business Corporations, 11 J. BUS.
ETHICS 857, 858 (1992) (discussing the results of the Opinion Research Corporation's survey of
American corporations for the Ethics Resource Center where 78% of the respondents indicated
that the principal benefits of ethics codes are legal protection); Patrick E. Murphy, Corporate
Ethics Statements: Current Status and Future Prospects, 14 J. BUS. ETHICS 727, 731 (1995)
("Some companies, unfortunately, believed that the public relations value was the most
important aspect of their codes of ethics.'); see also OPINION RESEARCH CORP., IMPLEMENTATION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF CODES OF ETHICS IN CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS (1980).
273. See, e.g., Terence R. Mitchell et al., Perceived Correlates of Illegal Behavior in Organi-
zations, 15 J. BUS. ETHICS 439, 443 (1996) ("While the research seems to indicate that about
90% of the major corporations in America have or are planning to have such codes the data
about their usefulness is less clear.'); Gary R. Weaver, Corporate Codes of Ethics: Purpose,
Process and Content Issues, BUS. & SOC'Y, Spring 1993, at 44, 51 ('Measuring the effectiveness
of ethics codes, programs and structures-intended as regulatory tools-is problematic, and
empirical study has provided at best mixed results.'); Gary R. Weaver, Does Ethics Code Design
Matter? Effects of Ethics Code Rationales and Sanctions on Recipients' Justice Perceptions and
Content Recall, 14 J. BUS. ETHICS 367 (1995) ("Although codes of ethics figure prominently in
organizations' efforts to reduce unethical behavior on the part [sic] their members, evidence on
the actual impact of codes is at best mixed.'); William A. Weeks & Jacques Nantel, Corporate
Codes of Ethics and Sales Force Behavior: A Case Study, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 753 (1992).
274. See M. Neil Browne et al., The Seductive Danger of Craft Ethics for Business
Organizations, REV. BUS., Winter 1995-1996, at 23, 27 ("Citicorp's principles make it clear they
are concerned about protecting themselves from the behavior of their own employees.'); Betsy
Stevens, An Analysis of Corporate Ethical Code Studies: "Where Do We Go From Here?" 13 J.
Bus. ETHICS 63, 67 (1994):
Firms seem primarily concerned with employee misconduct which might
damage the firm.... [Tihe codes seem preoccupied with following laws.
While ethical codes should promote law-abiding behavior, it appears that
they are preoccupied with law enforcement and self-defense and often do not
rise above this plateau to successfully articulate the values, beliefs, and
precepts of a desirable corporate culture.
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codes as an exercise in public relations.275 Most companies with codes
have not institutionalized a mechanism or series of procedures to
respond to violations. 276 Finally, commentators have noted that ethics
codes are often poorly integrated into firm culture. 277
Studies pointing to the inadequacy of ethics codes are sup-
ported by the results of a series of national surveys of ethical corpo-
rate culture. For example, in a recent Benchmark Survey of 1,694
large and medium-sized firms in the United States, 27% of the
respondents indicated that their organization knowingly broke the
law "at least sometimes"; 17% acknowledged that where profit motive
and ethics conflict, the former governs; 41% of the respondents
acknowledged being aware of legal or ethical problems in their
organization; only 37% of employees reported feeling comfortable
reporting such misconduct; and 45% of all employees admitted feeling
pressured to "cut corners. ' 278  Finally, employees viewed senior
management with suspicion: only 46% of all employees thought that
management took responsibility for its actions; 45% of managers were
viewed as acting fairly; and 40% were characterized as keeping their
promises. 279
The results of the 1997 Society for Human Resource Manage-
ment/Ethics Resource Center Survey mirror the Benchmark
Survey.2 0 In this study of 747 human resource professionals, 61%
reported that their firms did not provide ethics training; 47% of the
respondents reported feeling at least some pressure to compromise
their organization's code of ethics to achieve business objectives-for
275. See generally Kaye, supra note 272, at 858.
276. See, e.g., R. Murray Lindsay et al., Instilling Ethical Behavior in Organizations: A
Survey of Canadian Companies, 15 J. BUS. ETHICS 393, 401 (1996) ("The fact that 88 percent of
the 84 companies attempting to instill ethical behavior did not have an ethics focused reward
system raises important questions regarding the motivation that organizations are providing
their employees to behave ethically.'); Murphy, supra note 272, at 731 ("Anywhere from 10 to
30% of companies who have codes of ethics do not have systems in place for dealing with
violations.').
277. See Isaac D. Montoya & Alan J. Richard, A Comparative Study of Codes of Ethics in
Health Care Facilities and Energy Companies, 13 J. BUS. ETHICS 713, 717 (1994):
Despite relatively recent media attention focused on codes of ethics, our
study indicates that the adoption of such codes is rarely accompanied by
either a thorough development process or a system for assuring that the
codes are known and used. As is indicated by existing literature, the
absence of clear evaluation standards reflects a situation within which
neither management nor employees know what to expect from a code of
ethics.
278. See WALKER INFORMATION, A NATIONAL BENCHMARK STUDY ON BUSINESS ETHICS
(1998) (on file with author).
279. See id. at 2.
280. See SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENTIETHICS RESOURCE CTR., BUSINESS
ETHICS SURVEY REPORT (1998) (on file with author).
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reasons of meeting financial or business objectives (50%), scheduling
demands (38%), and ensuring organizational survival (30%).281
Evidence of the failure of ethics codes to affect corporate cul-
ture and structure is supported by organizational theories that sug-
gest that there is a strong resistance to significant change on the part
of many companies in stable environments. 2 2  Inertial constraints
arise from both internal and external factors. Internally, there is the
nontransferability of fixed expenses and investment, the limited
access to and availability of information, the acceptance of custom and
internal norms, and internal politics. 2 8 3  External pressures that
create inertia include legal and financial barriers, the availability of
information, and legitimacy constraints. 2 4 In many cases, both inter-
nal and external inertia pressures cause inertia, which in turn results
in organizations pursuing "a very narrow repertoire of strategies. ''28 1
Stability and common routines move firms to maintain the status quo
and resist change, until and unless significant problems arise.28 6 The
results of these surveys are concerning given the value placed by
prosecutors on the existence of effective compliance initiatives, and
the absence of objective measures of effectiveness. This concern is
magnified by the often complicit role of top management.
B. Corporate Deviance and the "Winking" of Top Management
Of all internal factors accounting for corporate crime, not one
comes close in importance to the role of top management in tolerating,
281. See id. at 4.
282. For a discussion of organizational "imprinting," see WILLIAM C. FREDERICK, VALUES,
NATURE, AND CULTURE IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION 297 (1995) (discussing compliance
initiatives as organizational innovations, and concluding that they "must lean against the
powerful inertial forces of nature and of sociocultural habit long ingrained in the business
institution. Even when sincerely adopted and skillfully launched, they cannot be expected to
yield revolutionary results.'); Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Social Structure and Organizations, in
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS 142-91 (James G. March ed., 1965); Deborah Vidaver Cohen,
Creating and Maintaining Ethical Work Climates: Anomie in the Workplace and Implications for
Managing Change, 3 BUS. ETHICS Q. 343, 353 (1993) ("[Slignificant organizational resistance
occurs quite predictably whenever intensive transformations in institutional culture are
considered."); cf. Linda Klebe Trevino, A Cultural Perspective on Changing and Developing
Organizational Ethics, in 4 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT 195
(William A. Pasmore & Richard W. Woodman eds., 1990).
283. See MICHAEL T. HANNAN & JOHN FREEMAN, ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY 66-90 (1989)
(arguing that structural inertia in organizations may be explained as an outcome of an
ecological-evolutionary process).
284. See generally Danny Miller et al., The Evolution of Strategic Simplicity: Exploring Two
Models of Organizational Adaptation, 22 J. MGMT. 863 (1996).
285. Id. at 865-66.
286. See generally Danny Miller, The Architecture of Simplicity, 18 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 116
(1993).
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even shaping, a corporate culture that allows for deviance. 287  Senior
management, in some firms, is well known for sending conflicting
signals to middle management about short-term expectations,
mandatory objectives, as well as contingent incentives and reward
systems. This signaling risks encouraging deviant norms, while
promoting a coercive organizational culture.28 8  The consensus view
emerging among corporate crime scholars is that "corporate wrong-
doing is more often the result of actions or inactions, deliberate or
inadvertent, by the top managers of the organization.112 9
The line distinguishing the advertence or inadvertence of
managerial actions, however, is often difficult to draw. For example,'
it has been argued that it is not uncommon for top management to
lose control and direct supervision over subunits as well as
subordinate employees, once an organization reaches a certain size,
level of complexity, and specialization.2 9 0  This loss of supervisory
287. For a review of corporate crime causation theory, see Sally S. Simpson, Strategy,
Structure, and Corporate Crime: The Historical Context of Anticompetitive Behavior, in 4
ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 71 (Freda
Adler & William S. Laufer eds., 1993). See also Melissa S. Baucus & Janet P. Near, Can Illegal
Corporate Behavior Be Predicted? An Event History Analysis, 34 ACAD. MGMT. J. 9 (1991);
Charles W.L. Hill et al., An Empirical Examination of the Causes of Corporate Wrongdoing in
the United States, 45 HUM. REL. 1055 (1992); Jon M. Joyce, Effect of Firm Organizational
Structure on Incentives to Engage in Price Fixing, CONTEMP. POLY ISSUES, Oct. 1989, at 19;
Eugene Szwajkowski, Organizational Illegality: Theoretical Integration and Illustrative
Application, 10 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 558 (1985).
288. See, e.g., Vaughan, supra note 73 (discussing the crime in relation to the role of top
management in establishing the norms and reward systems that shape the ethical conduct of
subordinates); Kriesberg, supra note 43 (noting the situations in which top management may
direct, enable, or acquiesce to illegal activity). For an extensive discussion of the role of top
management in corporate crime, see MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME:
THE ROLE OF MIDDLE MANAGEMENT 71 (1983) ('In our survey, middle management was clearly
of the opinion that the very nature of top management's position and its actual behavior is
largely responsible for unethical or illegal corporate behavior.).
289. Anthony J. Daboub et al., Top Management Team Characteristics and Corporate
Illegal Activity, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 138, 138-39 (1995) (describing the consensus view that
corporate crime is most often the result of the inactions of top management). This was the
conclusion of the much heralded survey of 582 of the largest corporations by Clinard and his
colleagues in 1979:
The delegation of responsibility and unwritten orders often serve to isolate
top management from the legal consequences of their policy decisions. The
complex structural relationships of large corporations make it difficult, if not
impossible, to disentangle delegated authority, managerial discretion, and
ultimate responsibility. By tending to fix blame on middle-managers,
criminal codes reflect an individualistic bias that obscures the organizational
nature of corporate violations. Upper-level management may be left
unscathed for actions to which they are at least contributing, if not
causative, elements.
CLINARD, supra note 73, at 206.
290. See CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE: PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 7-9 (M. David Ermann & Richard J. Lundman eds., 5th
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control by top management, or authority leakage, allows for corporate
deviance by lower-level employees often without any evidence of the
knowledge or approval of top management.2 91 Where there is evidence
of knowledge or tacit approval, top management can be quite
successful in displaying a deliberate indifference to or ignorance of
middle management or subordinate employee deviance.292 Typical are
the remarks of Senator Kefauver who, after extensive hearings on the
Electrical Equipment Antitrust cases in the early 1960s, concluded:
[I]t has been found many times, top corporation executives 'wink' at criminal
antitrust violations going on right under their noses. Rather than assure that
the antitrust laws were being obeyed by their subordinates, such executives
take great pains to make certain that they have no 'knowledge' of any illegal
activities.29
3
ed. 1996). See generally Vaughan, supra note 73. Courts recognize the problem of control in
their consideration of corporate liability. See Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d
33, 83 (Mass. 1971):
In a large corporation, with many numerous and distinct departments, a
high ranking corporate officer or agent may have no authority or
involvement in a particular sphere of corporate activity, whereas a lower
ranking corporate executive might have much broader power in dealing with
a matter peculiarly within the scope of his authority.
291. See CLINARD, supra note 288, at 71 (reporting how respondents to his survey
emphasized the role of top management in selecting personnel to "fit their patterns of doing
business."); Brickey, supra note 73, at 628 ('It bears observing that if corporate directors may
rely upon their subordinates until something untoward reaches their attention, they will remain
ignorant of facts crucial to effective corporate governance.'). According to one commentary,
evidentiary issues accompany investigations of large corporations. See Developments in the
Law, supra note 23, at 1255 ("Moreover, in a large corporation, the existence of several tiers of
middle-level supervisors makes it more difficult for the prosecutor to prove that a command or
authorization originated with an upper echelon policymaking official.').
292. See JOHN E. CONKLIN, "ILLEGAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL": BUSINESS CRIME IN AMERICA 65
(1977) ('The delegation of responsibility and unwritten orders keep those at the top of the
corporate structure remote from the consequences of their decisions and orders, much as the
heads of organized crime families remain 'untouchable' by the law."); Coffee, supra note 76, at
398 ("[Decentralization] permits the central headquarters to insulate itself from responsibility
for operational decisions while simultaneously pressuring for quick solutions to often intractable
problems.').
293. Comment, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the
Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 303 n.71 (1961) (alteration in original) (quoting Press
Release from Senator Kefauver's Office, (July 13, 1961)); see also CLARENCE C. WALTON &
FREDERICK W. CLEVELAND, JR., CORPORATIONS ON TRIAL: THE ELECTRIC CASES 82 (1964)
(quoting Judge Ganey):
'I am convinced that in the great number of these defendants' cases, they
were torn between conscience and an approved corporate policy, with the
rewarding objectives of promotion, comfortable security and large salaries-
in short, the organization or the company man, the conformist, who goes
'along with his superiors and finds balm for his conscience in the additional
comforts and the security of his place in the corporate set-up.'
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The subtleties of the top management perspective were
captured as early as 1955 by drafters of the Model Penal Code, who
commented that organizational crime may be "produced by pressures
on the subordinates created by corporate managerial officials even
though the latter may not have intended or desired the criminal
behavior and even though the pressures can only be sensed rather
than demonstrated. '294 Given the role of top management in charting
the course of legal and ethical compliance in corporations, it is
difficult to underestimate the importance of subtle pressures to walk
the fine line between law abidance and law deviation. Few
underestimate the less-than-subtle pressures to maximize profits,
reduce costs, and meet sales goals or quotas. 295
The range of pressures felt by middle managers and sub-
ordinate employees must be considered in light of the perception by
employees that top management is often aware of legal and ethical
violations-that they are "winking. '296 The phenomenon of winking is
further complicated by the tendency of subordinate employees and
middle management not to question the policies, judgments, and deci-
sions of senior management.297 The corresponding tendency of senior
management to foist blame on unwary agents when a line is
crossed, 298 and ease at which violations of both the corporate policy
See also Kadish, supra note 85, at 431-32 ("[T]he high policy makers of General Electric and
other companies involved escaped personal accountability for a criminal conspiracy of lesser
officials that extended over several years to the profit of the corporations, despite the belief of
the trial judge and most observers that these higher officials either knew of and condoned these
activities or were willfully ignorant of them.').
294. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 commentary at 149 (Tentative Draft No. 4 1955).
295. According to one of Clinard's respondents, "You get the pressure so strong from top
management that you will make judgmental efforts to make things come out right even if you
use unethical practices such as lying about production or marketing progress. Pressures can
result in cutting corners, e.g., on quality; a corporation has got to be a going concern." CLINARD,
supra note 288, at 142.
296. See id. at 140 ("Middle management executives tended to feel that corporate pressures
at their level were extensive and serious. Undue pressures from top management, they
maintained, may result in unethical or illegal behavior.!). The concept of "winking" may be
traced back to Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 125 (5th Cir. 1962) ("Since the
record is absolutely barren of even the most remote whisper of suspicion that this was the case
of corporations winking at dereliction by energetic, zealous employees, the Government
stresses, for both a legal and psychological purpose, the contention that the two corporations
received some benefit.'). See also Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719 (5th
Cir. 1963).
297. See generally John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals Into
Evildoing, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note
231, at 13 (discussing the costs of disobeying orders from superiors to engage in unethical or
illegal actions).
298. The effects of both winking and scapegoating are seen most clearly in organizations
where there is significant diffusion and fragmentation of information and responsibility. See
generally id.
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and the law all may be hidden in the complexity of the corporate
form.29 9  As one commentator noted, "Big corporations implicitly
encourage scapegoating by their complete lack of any tracking system
to trace responsibility."300
Empirical research in the banking industry suggests that top
management winking is linked to two features of the corporate
form.301 The first is a segmentation of moral views by rank, status, or
hierarchy within the organization. As one commentator notes, "Cor-
porations implicitly house a division of moral labour according to
which managers at different ranks are inclined to perceive dilemmas
from differing moral angles. '30 2 The importance of this segmentation
is evident when top management expresses an allegiance to corporate
values and policies, while implicitly supporting if not encouraging
unethical or illegal actions.30 3 In such situations, there is often an
untenable conflict between top management's perception of a business
need, the primacy of business goals, and what appears to be a restric-
tive corporate policy.304
299. See, e.g., James William Coleman, The Theory of White-Collar Crime: From Suther-
land to the 1990s, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED, supra note 7, at 53, 69 ("Numerous
social scientists have commented on the way large corporations encourage a narrow pragmatic
approach to organizational responsibilites among their employees, which strongly discourages
independent ethical judgments.'). For an excellent discussion of the pressures placed on middle
managers by superiors, see ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE
MANAGERS (1988); see also Myron W. Watkins, Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases-Their
Implications for Government and for Business, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 107 (1961) (discussing the
difficulty of affixing blame "in the bewildering complexity and intricate ramifications of the
administrative set-up in the modern 'big business' corporation, the spheres of delegated
authority and of managerial discretion are virtually impossible to disentangle").
300. JACKALL, supra note 299, at 87. In Professor Clinard's survey of middle managers, for
example, 92.2% of the respondents credited top management with setting the "ethical tone for
compliance with government laws and regulations." CLINARD, supra note 288, at 71. Seventy-
one percent of the respondents surveyed indicated that top management had positive knowledge
of illegalities. According to the survey, "respondents felt that, in general, top management was
most likely to know of any anti-trust violations, pricefixing infractions, possible serious plant or
consumer (design) safety violations, large kickbacks, illegal foreign payoffs, and about such
broad areas as violations in production quality, labor, the EPA, and tax matters." Id. at 74-79.
301. See generally Peter Cleary Yeager, Management, Morality, and Law: Organizational
Forms and Ethical Deliberations, in CORPORATE CRIME: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 147 (Frank
Pearce & Laureen Snider eds., 1995).
302. Id. at 154.
303. Professor Yeager observes that "these guiding values, policies, and goals appear to be
both internally consistent and rationally related to the companies' legitimate purposes. But
under the complex requirements of management in large organizations, managers often
experience them as dictating contradictory choices, and ones often ethically (if not always
legally) suspect." Id.
304. Yeager notes that "business hierarchies impart a characteristic moral stance to their
managers, which typically minimizes many private moral concerns in the service of
organizational ends." See id. at 150.
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The critical role of top management, along with the perception
of their winking, has led courts to caution that "to conceal the nefari-
ous acts of their underlings by using the shield of corporate armor to
deflect corporate responsibility, and to separate the subordinate from
the executive, would be to permit 'endocratic' corporations to inflict
widespread public harm without hope of redress."30 5  This caution,
however, is without meaning for firms in certain industries and
markets where pressures are, at times, too much for middle
managers, supervisory personnel, and subordinates to bear. 30 6
C. The Paradox of Compliance and Its Resolution
Much has been made of the paradox of moral hazard-less loss
from loss means more loss. 3 0 7 The paradox of cosmetic compliance as
a form of risk management reflects the same basic economics and
logic. The purchase of compliance sufficient to shift the risk of liabil-
ity and loss, in certain firms, has the effect of decreasing levels of
care. Decreased levels of care with a top management that winks
fosters an environment of tacit acceptance of illegalities. This
acceptance, coupled with the constant pressure on middle manage-
ment to produce results, has led to increased deviance throughout the
corporate hierarchy.308 The purchase of compliance for purposes of
liability shifting and cost internalization results in a redefinition of
this deviance. Acts that were once held to be those of the firm, now
remain those of individual employees.3 9 The evisceration of vicarious
305. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 83-84 (Mass. 1971).
306. It is far from oversimplification to say that the choice for a strained and burdened
middle management is an attribution of incompetence-with the possibility of demotion or
dismissal--or the taking of shortcuts that risk violations of law. For an extensive consideration
of the problems and pressures of middle managers, see Coffee, supra note 76, at 396-400.
307. See Baker, supra note 27, at 269-72.
308. This is so in spite of any increase in offense rates that would be expected with greater
monitoring activity. Of course, increased enforcement activity naturally results in higher rates
of offending. See Sentencing Commissioner Predicts Compliance Efforts Will Only Become More
Crucial to Success in Business, Prevention of Corp. Liab. (BNA) 8 (June 1996) (discussing the
results of research that found that common compliance practices actually "may contribute to a
poor compliance environment").
309. The effect of moral hazards on organizations that have invested in compliance as
insurance may be seen as a function of compliance expenditures and top management tolerance
of illegality (winking). Deviance is most significant where corporations fail to invest in compli-
ance-no matter how defined-and, at the same time, tolerate illegalities (Model I). The
compromising effect of moral hazards may be seen in Model II where the combination of
significant compliance expenditures and winking result in moderate deviance. Finally, in
Models I and IV, deviance is limited by an absence of moral hazards, regardless of compliance
expenditures.
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liability along with unbridled prosecutorial discretion in the intuitive
evaluation of compliance effectiveness may be used to explain the
steady increase in white-collar prosecution. Moral hazard theory
reveals that certain compliance orientations have the counterintuitive
effect of increasing white-collar deviance.
Short of a significant reform of the corporate criminal law
which directly addresses the gaming problem caused by reactions to
vicarious liability, the paradox of compliance may be resolved only by
limiting the incentives that lead firms to purchase those programs
and initiatives that successfully shift liability and loss. In theory, this
might be accomplished in two ways. The first requires substantial
changes in discretionary prosecutorial policies: Prosecutors must
resist undermining principles of vicarious liability by rewarding due
diligence. This becomes increasingly important given the absence of
consensus on the meaning of effective compliance. The consideration
of corporate compliance in relation to corporate liability is a task
appropriately reserved in law for sentencing judges. Judicial deter-
minations of compliance effectiveness along with verifiable measure-
ments of the same will undercut incentives to diminish care and
reduce monitoring levels.3 10 Alternatively, regulators and prosecutors
might agree on specific criteria for effectiveness. It seems too much to
ask organizations to move beyond the rhetoric of "effective" compli-
I IU
LOW COMPLIANCE EXPENDITURES/ HIGH COMPLIANCE EXPENDITURES/
HIGH IMPLICIT TOLERANCE HIGH IMPLICIT TOLERANCE
III IV
LOW COMPLIANCE EXPENDITURES/ HIGH COMPLIANCE EXPENDITURES/
LOW IMPLICIT TOLERANCE LOW IMPLICIT TOLERANCE
310. See David Yellen, Compliance Programs and Coordination of Corp. Sanctions, BUS.
CRIMES BULL., Oct. 1995, at 6, 9 (noting with some frustration that federal prosecutors have
failed to send a clear message and should "appreciate that a consistent approach to the effect of
compliance programs would enable the government to sharpen its enforcement message. It
would also give companies a clearer picture of what constitutes an effective compliance program
and an indication of the potential benefits of implementing such a program.").
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ance before prosecutors have been able to meaningfully assess the
difference.31'
1. Changes in Discretionary Policies
The debate over the proper role and efficiency of prosecutorial
agencies continues.3 12 At the center of this debate is a body of scholar-
ship that considers the ideal relation between regulators and corpora-
tions. 313 Braithwaite's Enforced Self-Regulation Model, and Fisse and
Braithwaite's Accountability Model, for example, suggest the impor-
tance of corporate standards of conduct and disciplinary mechanisms
as a form of reciprocal constraint.3 14 Organizations self-regulate to
the deference of regulators. Practical considerations like the grant of
prosecutorial amnesty or the receipt of mitigation credit from the
Guidelines lends support to the importance of these idealized models.
The extent of a corporation's self-regulation will determine active
criminal investigation versus prosecutorial declination, enforcement
or non-enforcement, formal versus informal measures, monetary or
non-monetary sanctions, and civil proceedings or criminal indictment.
Left all but unattended in both theory and practice, however,
is the capacity of regulators, prosecutors, and courts to evaluate the
effectiveness or authenticity of corporate self-regulation. Pretend for a
moment that there is no history of risk shifting by corporations, and
that there is no evidence of internal or external initiatives on the part
of organizations to minimize entity liability by pushing blame down
the organizational hierarchy. Disregard the fairness of allowing
311. This is unfortunate because organizational integrity, corporate ethics, and good
corporate citizenship, after all, are said to impair moral hazards. See AMITAI ETzIONI, THE
MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 69 (1988) ("[The stronger the moral
underwriting of implicit contracts, the lower the transaction costs, resulting in less of a need to
buy hedge protection .... ).
312. See generally EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982); Ann P. Bartel & Lacy Glenn Thomas,
Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA's Impact, 28 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289
(1983); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 43 (1988); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521 (1981).
313. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 206; JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1984); JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
TO PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY (1985); Robert A. Kagan & John
T. Scholz, The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies, in
ENFORCING REGULATION 67 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1984); John T. Scholz,
Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement, 6 L. & POL'Y 385 (1984).
314. See generally FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 191; Braithwaite, supra note 89.
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prosecutors to craft new liability rules for corporate crimes all in the
name of discretion. Put aside concerns that this undercuts the full
force of vicarious liability, and results in diminished levels of care and
incentives to police due to moral hazards. Forget that businesses
with significant resources will be advantaged; and small, privately
held businesses, often without access to legal counsel, will remain the
disadvantaged targets of criminal prosecution. Even if one pretends,
disregards, and forgets, it remains that there is little wisdom in the
birth of new standards of corporate self-regulation without an agreed-
upon method of assessing compliance with those standards.
That no such method exists is made far worse by the fact that
corporations are all too aware of this fact. It is worth asking how
organizations assess the value of their compliance expenditures, no
less the effectiveness of internal standards and procedures. 315 It is
critically important to ask how the inability of regulators, prosecutors,
and courts to assess effectiveness influences corporate compliance
expenditures and programs. 316 Even conservative answers to these
two questions favor limited prosecutorial consideration of corporate
compliance programs. If one should add to this the problem of incen-
tives and moral hazards, then the case for restructuring prosecutorial
discretion becomes compelling.
315. For a discussion of the analogous issue in tort law, see generally John E. Calfee &
Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L.
REV. 965 (1984) (discussing the common problem of uncertainty about legal standards, and the
resulting problem of overcompliance or undercompliance).
316. This problem of assessing effective compliance is not limited to cases of corporate
crime. Consider how the absence of clear standards by which to judge effective compliance with
Title VII complicates an affirmative defense to liability for employers in a hostile work
environment case. Last term, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998), Justice
Souter crafted a due diligence defense requiring that: (1) employers exercise reasonable care "to
prevent and correct" any sexual harassment, and (2) employees take reasonable advantage of
such due care. Id. at 2293. Souter then added the caveat that while an employer may offer
proof of a corporate anti-harassment policy with appropriate complaint procedures, such proof is
not necessary as a matter of law. According to Souter, "the need for a stated policy suitable to
the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the
first element of the defense." Id. In giving recognition to the due diligence of employers, Souter
has complimented enforcement efforts and, at the same time, acknowledged the spirit of Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In fact, we are told that "a theory of vicarious
liability.., would be at odds with the statutory policy if it failed to provide employers with some
such incentive." Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292. Yet, if the history and the lessons of corporate
compliance apply, one might wonder how long it will be before most organizations have a
compliance "prescription" against Title VII liability. Soon thereafter, it will be interesting to see
how administrative agencies and then courts assess the effectiveness of an employer's due
diligence.
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2. Moving Beyond the Rhetoric of "Effective" Compliance
The idea that compliance must be effective is deceptively
simple. It is naive to say that compliance consultants preach a strict
adherence to the seven prescriptive steps found in the Guidelines, and
that ethics consultants see the integrity approach as the integration
of ethical values into corporate culture. What makes the notion of
effective compliance difficult, and somewhat deceptive, is that vastly
different compliance initiatives will share the same outcome criterion
(effectiveness) but will define it quite differently.
Consider that an organization may invest in compliance for a
host of reasons, some genuine, others used to justify expenses. These
reasons include satisfying the perceived requirements of the Guide-
lines, shifting liability down the corporate hierarchy, reducing
unethical or illegal behavior, increasing the reporting of unethical or
illegal behavior, promoting an ethical culture, and effecting corporate
strategy. 17
Determinations of effectiveness also vary by compliance orien-
tation, based in law, ethics, integrity, or a hybrid of all three.3 18 The
formality of the compliance orientation (undocumented versus
written), as well as the rationale supporting its implementation
(voluntary versus court ordered), affect assessments of effectiveness.
So, too, do the budgeted expenditures for compliance (effectiveness
determined by a cost/benefit analysis), the degree of regulatory risk in
a given industry or market (effectiveness determined by the extent of
regulatory oversight), and the methods used to assess effectiveness
(objective versus subjective).
Most important, moving beyond the rhetoric of "effective"' com-
pliance requires consistency between organizational assessments of
effectiveness and those of regulators, prosecutors, and courts. Until
this challenge is met, lest a dramatic reform of the general principles
of corporate criminal liability, the law offers few ways to address the
moral hazards of compliance.
317. See Freyer & Murphy, supra note 251.
318. See generally Paine, supra note 130.
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V. CONCLUSION
When the Commission finally completed its work in 1991, the
Guidelines reflected a trend toward conceptualizing corporate liability
and blameworthiness in the context of organizational theory. 319 The
objective was to fashion a genuine corporate fault so that organiza-
tional sanctions would have meaning. The problem, however, was
that the Guidelines did a far better job than the substantive criminal
law in accounting for organizational structures, systems, and
processes. In fact, the Guidelines made the simplistic liability regime
of vicarious liability look wholly inadequate.
Several years later, scholars proposed a number of models of
corporate culpability that would have complemented the steps taken
by the Commission to develop a body of law reflecting the uniqueness
of the corporate person. These theoretical models included proactive
and reactive corporate fault, corporate policy, corporate ethos, and
constructive corporate fault. 320 Unfortunately, courts and legislatures
did not rise to the challenge in the ensuing years. Instead, informal
prosecutorial guidelines and regulatory policy statements have
accommodated for the absence of statutory changes in liability rules
prompted by either scholarly or judicial conceptions of corporate
culpability. Problems of conflicting incentives and moral hazards
reflect the inadequacy of vicarious liability, a liability rule that has
been undermined by strategic interests from the time of Hudson. The
predictable evolution of risk shifting from the turn of the century, the
unwise vesting of unbridled prosecutorial discretion, and the cosmetic
nature of corporate compliance efforts together issue a loud and
powerful call for the reform of the substantive corporate criminal law.
319. See Laufer, supra note 76, at 1083.
320. See generally Brent Fisse, The Attribution of Criminal Liability to Corporations: A
Statutory Model, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 277 (1991) (proactive and reactive fault); Brent Fisse,
Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 15 CRIM. L.J. 166 (1991) (same). For an early discussion of
proactive and reactive fault based models, see Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal
Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1200 (1983)
("Reactive and proactive corporate mens rea provide alternative bases of corporate
blameworthiness, with proactive fault being relevant until the commission of the actus reus of
an offense, and reactive fault being relevant thereafter.'); see also PETER A. FRENCH,
COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984) (corporate policy); Pamela H. Bucy,
Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095
(1991) (corporate ethos); Ann Foerschler, Corporate Criminal Intent: Toward a Better
Understanding of Corporate Misconduct, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1287 (1990) (corporate ethos); Laufer,
Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, supra note 7 (constructive corporate fault); Moore, supra
note 18 (corporate culture and ethos).
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